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IMPROVING CRIMINAL JURY




The shift in sentencing fact-finding responsibility triggered in
many states by Blakely v. Washington may dramatically change the
complexity and type of questions that juries will be required to an-
swer. Among the most important challenges confronting legislatures
now debating the future of their sentencing regimes is whether juries
are prepared to handle this new responsibility effectively -and, if not,
what can be done about it. Yet neither scholars addressing the impact
of Blakely nor advocates of jury reform have seriously explored these
questions. Nonetheless, a number of limitations on juror decision
making seriously threaten the accuracy of verdicts in systems where
juries are given a more prominent role in finding sentencing facts. In
this article, we assess the capacity of juries to analyze and deliberate
on sentencing-related facts. We consider, inter alia, problems of cog-
nitive overload, frustration and loss of motivation due to complex
structures, difficulties evaluating evidence that juries do not ordinarily
consider, distortions due to the framing of nonbinary questions, and
deliberation-related biases. We also propose a model for sentencing-
stage jury proceedings that would minimize these problems. Its com-
ponents include bifurcation of proceedings, partial application of the
rules of evidence, special verdict forms that are carefully designed to
minimize framing effects, structural simplification of sentencing tasks,
a more active jury, and guidance for jurors on bias-reducing delibera-
tion structures.
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INTRODUCTION
More than a year and a half after the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Blakely v. Washington,' the future of state sentencing proce-
dures remains uncertain. Legislatures around the country continue to
grapple with the choice between abandoning binding guidelines and sub-
stantially expanding the role of juries in establishing the facts on which
criminal sentences are based. Some states have already shifted this fact-
finding responsibility to juries, and all states must decide (and continu-
ally reevaluate) how to allocate sentencing fact-finding power in light of
the constitutional rule announced in Blakely.2
Two questions are central to this choice. First, policymakers must
ask whether juries are competent to handle the fact-finding required at
the sentencing stage, which may encompass questions that are open-
ended or multiple-choice, both quantitative and qualitative in nature,
1. 524 U.S. 296 (2004).
2. Although Blakely's most immediate effects will be on states with mandatory sentencing
guideline schemes, its long-term implications are broader. Because the Court has imposed a perma-
nent constitutional constraint on the design of sentencing systems, every future legislature that consid-
ers a determinate scheme of closed sentencing ranges (whether comprehensive or specific to a particu-
lar crime) will have to consider whether juries are up to the task of finding the relevant facts.
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sometimes quite complicated, and often numerous. Second, and equally
central, lawmakers must consider whether, even if juries are not cur-
rently well suited to find sentencing facts effectively and accurately, the
procedures and evidentiary rules applicable at the sentencing stage can
be altered in ways that enable juries to perform their new tasks well.
One of the major criticisms of Blakely and its predecessor, Apprendi
v. New Jersey,3 raised for instance by Justice Breyer in his majority opin-
ion in United States v. Booker,4 has been that juries are just not very good
at the kinds of complex inquiries that sentencing under modern guide-
lines schemes requires. Neither the Blakely majority nor Apprendi's
scholarly defenders have disputed this possible incapacity, instead argu-
ing that inefficiency and error are unavoidable consequences of honoring
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.5 The question of jury competence,
however, has been left largely unexamined, leaving key questions unan-
swered. For example, in what ways are juries likely to fall short in their
new fact-finding tasks? Can these failings be remedied? As we discuss
in this article, juries are indeed prone to a variety of decisional errors,
many of which can be expected to occur more frequently and in new
ways as juries take on their post-Blakely responsibilities. In shaping and
implementing post-Blakely sentencing frameworks, policymakers and
judges should not assume that the jury's incapacities are fixed. Instead,
Blakely should trigger serious attention to the ways that these incapaci-
ties might play out in the sentencing setting, and to new reforms that can
enable juries to adapt successfully to their new responsibilities. The jury
reform literature to date has not explored these issues.
This article thus has two goals. The first is to assess the cognitive
and deliberative biases that will hamper jury performance in finding sen-
tencing facts. The second is to present a model of jury fact-finding that
will minimize the effects of these biases. It bears noting that the issue in
question is jury fact-finding, not jury sentencing; we assume that even in
states that increase juries' roles, judges will continue to apply the sen-
tencing guidelines and choose sentences on the basis of the factual find-
ings made by juries. We will address jury sentencing only to the extent
that studies of it (in capital cases and, in a few states, noncapital cases)
provide useful guidance as to juries' fact-finding capacities. In addition,
unlike most current work on Blakely, we do not seek to answer the ques-
tion whether and to what extent juries should be finding sentencing facts
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
5. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310-11; see Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the
Meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281, 303-04 (2001) (arguing that the "Ap-
prendi principle preserves the integrity of our constitutional doctrines by requiring that the legislature
respect the distinction between its offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers").
6. See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Deci-
sionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1138-40 (2005).
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in the first place. We do, however, seek to inform the present debate on
those questions by providing a realistic assessment of juries' capacities, as
well as a creative approach to reform.
We identify four categories of potential post-Blakely problems, ad-
dressed in Parts II through V of this article, respectively. First, effective
consideration of sentencing factors will require admission of certain
types of evidence that juries ordinarily do not hear at the trial stage-yet
juries may be prejudiced by this evidence if it is admitted at trial, and
may be ill-equipped to evaluate much of it at any stage. Second, special
verdict forms or other means of presenting new and nonbinary sentenc-
ing questions to the jury run the risk of distorting fact-finding through
framing effects and confusing the jury by asking it to draw ill-defined
comparisons. Third, the tremendous complexity of jurors' post-Blakely
tasks threatens to cause cognitive overload, undermining information-
processing capacity and motivation. Finally, because sentencing offers
jurors a wide range of verdict outcomes, they will be subject to certain
deliberation biases-such as vote-trading or polarization -that typically
have significantly less impact at the trial stage.
The solutions we propose to these problems address each of the ob-
vious post-Blakely policy questions facing legislatures, as well as some
that have heretofore been ignored. We argue for bifurcation of proceed-
ings in order to prevent prejudice resulting from the introduction of sen-
tencing evidence at the trial stage, and to reduce complexity and confu-
sion at each stage of the proceedings. We recommend a partial
application of the rules of evidence at jury proceedings related to sen-
tencing, permitting the jury to consider evidence that jurors are fully ca-
pable of weighing, like hearsay, but excluding, for instance, irrelevant or
highly prejudicial information. In order to minimize cognitive overload
and loss of motivation, we suggest reducing the structural complexity of
sentencing tasks, making jurors more active in proceedings, and permit-
ting experimentation with division of responsibilities among jurors. And
to minimize deliberation biases, we propose a shift away from the tradi-
tional model in which jurors are provided little guidance on how to de-
liberate, in favor of judges recommending structures that may reduce
post-Blakely biases.
Today, legislatures across the country are facing the question
whether to commit sentencing fact-finding to the jury-the Blakely
route-or instead to transform their guidelines, as the Court did with the
federal system in Booker, by making the guideline ranges either open-
7. Others have suggested many creative ways to reform and improve state guidelines systems in
view of Blakely's upending of many long established regimes, but have not addressed how to improve
jury performance. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1190 (2005) (surveying state guidelines systems
and analyzing salient policy issues such as resource constraints and the role of guidelines in various
sentencing contexts); Richard E. Myers II, Restoring the Peers in the "Bulwark": Blakely v. Washing-
ton and the Court's Jury Project, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1383 (2005).
[Vol. 2006
IMPROVING JURIES AFTER BLAKELY
ended or voluntary. Beyond that threshold decision, the states that
choose the former approach face the equally critical question of how the
new jury proceedings should work. But the fact that this question comes
later does not mean it is secondary-the potential effectiveness of reform
in improving jury decision making will influence the desirability of rely-
ing on juries to determine sentencing facts in the first place. These inter-
related questions, which affect thousands of sentencing decisions each
day as well as the fairness, credibility, and effectiveness of the justice sys-
tem as a whole, could hardly be more important. Legislatures should
neither decide hastily to avoid juries altogether-without at least consid-
ering whether they could be used effectively in carefully structured pro-
ceedings-nor commit to a major shift in fact-finding responsibility with-
out a fuller understanding of the limitations on jury decision making.
I. SHAPING THE POST-BLAKELY JURY: BACKGROUND AND
OBJECTIVES
A. Blakely and Its Aftermath
In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court vacated, as inconsis-
tent with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, a sentence that had
been enhanced under the state sentencing guidelines scheme based on a
judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was
committed with "deliberate cruelty."8 The decision built on the Court's
earlier holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, which involved a state statu-
tory sentencing enhancement. In both cases, the Court held that, with
the possible exception of criminal history, facts increasing a defendant's
maximum sentencing exposure must be proven to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the tradi-
tional distinction between offense elements and "sentencing factors,"
reasoning that if a fact raises a defendant's maximum sentence, it is func-
tionally indistinguishable from an element.1°
The Blakely decision triggered a flood of litigation and mass confu-
sion, not least concerning its implications for the federal sentencing sys-
8. 542 U.S. at 313-14.
9. Id. at 302; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494-96 (2000). But see Almendarez-Torres
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1998) (holding that past offenses need not be proven to the jury
for the purpose of applying a recidivist statute). The Court in Apprendi suggested that Almendarez-
Torres may well have been wrongly decided, 530 U.S. at 489, but found it unnecessary to revisit the
issue. Id. at 490. In Shepard v. United States, a plurality of the Court again flagged the issue without
deciding it. 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1262-63, n.5 (2005). The dissenting Justices argued that Shepard, which
addressed a related issue, would portend the demise of Almendarez-Torres. Id. at 1269-70 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote in concurrence that Almendarez-Torres should be overruled. Id.
at 1264 (Thomas, J., concurring). But see Douglas Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 89 (2004) (arguing that Blakely's logic only requires juries to determine characteristics of the of-
fense, not the offender).
10. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-08; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494-96.
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tem." The Supreme Court quickly took up this question. United States v.
Booker,12 released in January 2005, contained two key holdings reached
by different majorities. First, Justice Stevens wrote for the five Justices
in the Apprendi/Blakely majority that Blakely's Sixth Amendment hold-
ing applied to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This holding meant that
the Guidelines could not continue to operate as a mandatory sentencing
scheme based on judicial fact-finding, but left open the question of how
the system should be adapted to solve this problem. On this question,
Justice Breyer wrote for the four Apprendi/Blakely dissenters, plus Jus-
tice Ginsburg, who was the swing vote. In contrast to the approach taken
in Blakely, the Court in Booker declined to shift fact-finding to the jury
and instead chose to invalidate the statutory provision that made the• • 14
Guidelines mandatory, rendering them advisory instead. This approach
solved the constitutional problem -so long as the Guidelines did not
mandate a lower sentence, the Sixth Amendment did not bar a judge
from choosing a higher one on the basis of judicially determined facts-
at the cost of abandoning a binding, determinate sentencing system.
The Booker Court's choice of remedy was based principally on
practical concerns about jury fact-finding, echoing those outlined by the
dissenters in Apprendi and Blakely. These included fears that jurors
would become overwhelmed by the number of sentencing factors and
amount of evidence involved; that determination of some sentencing
factors would be legally difficult or factually complex; 7 that defendants
would be placed in a strategic bind at unitary proceedings because intro-
ducing evidence on sentencing factors might seem to admit guilt;18 that
sentencing-related guilt determinations would generally prejudice the
jury in determining guilt, and bifurcation to solve this problem would be
too costly; 19 and that some facts relevant to sentencing (such as probation
reports or evidence of the defendant's perjury or misconduct at trial) are
not available until after trial.20 Plea bargaining would not eliminate these
problems, the Court observed, for these considerations would affect each
11. See Rosemary T. Cakmis, The Role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the Wake of
United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, 56 MERCER L. REv. 1131, 1145-46 (2005).
12. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
13. Id. at 749-50.
14. Id. at 743.
15. The Justices unanimously concluded that the Booker remedy satisfied the Sixth Amend-
ment's requirements, although at least one scholar has disagreed. See Frank 0. Bowman, 1II, Beyond
BandAids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149,
181-83 (2005) (arguing that only fully advisory guidelines can be squared with the Sixth Amendment,
while the post-Booker Guidelines are not fully advisory because departures from them can be re-
viewed for reasonableness).
16. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 556-57 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 762 (citing, e.g., determination of loss in securities fraud cases).
18. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 319 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
20. Id. See generally Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that these practi-
cal concerns are overstated and have not been borne out in states' experiences after Blakely and Ap-
prendi).
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side's incentives to enter a plea agreement."1 The Court acknowledged
that its choice of remedy was "not the last word: The ball now lies in
Congress' court.
22
Even if Congress leaves the Court's chosen remedy in place, how-
ever, the issues posed by Blakely and Booker remain open questions at
the state level, the locus of more than ninety percent of criminal sentenc-
ing.23 Booker puts state legislatures in guidelines states in an odd posi-
tion: they have been told by Blakely to shift sentencing fact-finding to
the jury, and yet a new majority of the Court has now declared that ap-
proach impracticable on the federal level. State sentencing schemes are
less intricate than the federal guidelines, but many of the possible prob-
lems the Court raised in Booker are equally applicable to state regimes.
States are, however, free to disagree with the Court's policy judgments,
and some guidelines states have already begun moving toward jury fact-
finding.24 Indeed, in Kansas a system employing jury fact-finding in some
cases has been in effect since before Blakely, following a post-Apprendi
decision of that state's supreme court.2' But states considering the adop-
21. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 762; see also Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (developing this argument in the civil
context). But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2466 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REv. 2548,2553-58 (2004).
22. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
23. William H. Pryor Jr., Lessons of a Sentencing Reformer from the Deep South, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 943, 956 (2005).
24. As of October 2005, at least six state legislatures had already adopted "Blakely-izing" legisla-
tion shifting at least some sentencing fact-finding to the jury: Alaska, Kansas, Minnesota, North Caro-
lina, Oregon, and Washington. For a useful compilation of these and other state responses to Blakely,
see Douglas A. Berman, Doug Berman's Sentencing Law Resources (Blakely in the States), http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/facultyfberman/blakely-states.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2005). The compilation
shows that in most of the other states with binding guidelines systems, the legislative response to
Blakely remains uncertain, although Tennessee has adopted an approach along the lines of Booker. In
addition, some nonguidelines states are moving toward jury consideration of statutory sentencing en-
hancements. See, e.g., INDIANA STATE LEGISLATURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SENTENCING POLICY
STUDY COMMITTEE 97, available at http://www.in.govllegislative/igareports/agency/reports/SPSC1.
pdf (proposing legislative changes).
25. See State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001). In Kansas, factors supporting upward dur-
ational departures must be tried to a jury, and the judge determines whether to bifurcate proceedings.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4716 to -4718 (2002). Jurors use a special verdict form. See KAN. MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 71.00, available at http://www.ussc.gov/STATES/blakely/KS /20Forms.pdf; see
also Adam Liptak, Justices' Sentencing Ruling May Have Model in Kansas, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004,
at A12 (describing states' use of Kansas as a model). At least initially, Kansas's system has not re-
sulted in a large number of bifurcated proceedings. Douglas A. Berman, Doug Berman's Sentencing
Law Resources (Blakely in the States-Kansas), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/berman/states/
kansas.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) (quoting Ron Wright). The reasons for this are uncertain, but
speculation has included "'fear of the unknown,"' which might encourage both sides to engage in plea-
and sentence-bargaining to avoid jury proceedings, as well as certain peculiarities of Kansas law that
give Kansas judges fairly wide discretion to impose effectively longer sentences-for example, impos-
ing sentences consecutively-even if no aggravating factors are found. Id. Based on these explana-
tions, it is not safe to assume on the basis of Kansas's early experiences that jury proceedings will be
unusual even in states that follow the Blakely route. In states with different legal frameworks, and
after some time has passed such that jury involvement is less novel, such proceedings may well become
the norm. And because expectations concerning the result of jury proceedings help to shape the plea-
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tion of jury fact-finding would be mistaken not to give serious attention
to addressing the various problems likely to accompany jury fact-finding,
including those raised by the Court in Booker.
It is important to note that the issues presented by this article are
not limited in relevance to the fourteen states that currently rely on bind-
26
ing guidelines or functionally equivalent statutory schemes. Even states
without such schemes often have a number of particular statutory sen-
tencing enhancements that depend on judicial fact-finding. 7 Moreover,
Blakely and Apprendi impose a permanent constitutional restraint on
sentencing procedure in every state, and in the federal courts. The jury's
competence at fact-finding will thus be relevant to every future legisla-
ture considering adopting mandatory sentences triggered by certain facts.
Even if many states choose not to switch to a jury-based sentencing sys-
tem in the near term, it is important for states to have an informed un-
derstanding of how juries are likely to function at the sentencing stage.
Nonetheless, we focus on the existing state guideline regimes in or-
der to provide a sense of the new kinds of questions jurors will likely
have to answer post-Blakely. State guidelines are generally simpler than
their federal counterparts, yet contain numerous sentencing factors that
are quite diverse in kind. Some of the new questions will be objective in
character-e.g., drug quantity, amount of economic injury, number of
victims, age of offender, and whether the crime was committed on school
property. Others will be far more subjective, involving terms that have
no clear definition or that appeal to jurors' moral judgments. These in-
clude characterizations of a defendant's state of mind (for example, racial
bias, as in Apprendi, or "deliberate cruelty," as in Blakely), or of offense
severity relative to other instances of the same statutory offense (for in-
stance, "excessive brutality" or whether a victim is "vulnerable'). 28Still
others will involve both subjective and objective components. More-
bargaining process, distortions even in a small number of jury proceedings may have an impact even
on defendants who never see a jury at all. See supra note 21.
26. Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington-Practical Implica-
tions for State Sentencing Systems, POLY & PRAC. REV. (Vera Inst. of Justice), Aug. 2004, at 2.
27. Id. In addition, although Booker makes clear that wholly voluntary guidelines schemes are
not affected by Blakely, the decision may arguably still affect those states in which judges must provide
justifications for departing from advisory guidelines. See id. at 4.
28. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716 (2002) (excessive brutality and vulnerable victim en-
hancements); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2005) (vulnerable victim); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-
002(1)(b) (2004) ("The degree of harm or loss involved was significantly greater than typical for such
an offense.").
29. Tennessee, for instance, applies an enhancement if an offense involved injury or property
damage that was "particularly great" -requiring an objective calculation of injury amount, but a sub-
jective characterization whether this amount is "particularly great." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-114
(2004); see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 106, 106 (Dec.
2004) ("Factors pertinent to sentencing are often complex and involve legal, factual and value judg-
ments all at once."); R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 739, 765-66 (2001)
(observing that different individuals define "bodily injury" differently, such that a seemingly factual
determination includes a subjective judgment).
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over, the complexity of juries' tasks will vary, with even many "objec-
tive" determinations proving quite difficult.3°
Each legislature that chooses to shift to jury fact-finding will be
forced to confront several crucial structural and procedural questions:
whether to shift all sentencing fact-finding responsibility to the jury, or
instead only aggravating factors, or some other subset;3 whether the re-
sulting jury proceedings should be unitary or bifurcated into trial and
sentencing phases; whether and to what extent the rules of evidence
should apply at such proceedings; and how questions should be posed to
the jury. In addition, legislatures should also consider reforms to court-
room or deliberation procedures to improve the jury's sentence fact-
finding capacities post-Blakely. It would be unwise for legislatures to in-
crease and significantly change the burdens jurors face without providing
them the tools they need to manage those new tasks.
B. Objectives of Jury Reform
This article aims to identify, and propose solutions to, the biases in-
troduced by shifting sentencing fact-finding power from judges to juries.
Our specific recommendations are shaped by an understanding that jury
reform must balance a number of competing goals. For instance, "accu-
racy," in the sense of results that track the actual history of the events at
issue, not only is critical to effective deterrence and incapacitation of
32wrongdoers, but also has a vital moral purpose. But achieving an accu-
rate outcome is plainly not the only goal of the criminal justice process."
The reasonable doubt standard reduces the total number of "accurate"
outcomes (defined in this narrow sense) because it leads to guilty people
going free. Society finds this sort of inaccuracy acceptable because it
values procedural fairness to criminal defendants, believing that wrong-
ful convictions are far worse than erroneous acquittals.34
Slightly broader than "accuracy," perhaps, is the concept of "ration-
ality" in juror decision making. "Rationality" is often equated with the
30. See infra Part IV.
31. One important question is whether mitigating factors, in addition to aggravating ones, should
be submitted to juries in post-Blakely proceedings. The Constitution imposes no such requirement,
see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), but there may be prudential reasons to consider
both aggravating and mitigating factors at once-for instance, the efficiency gain from having only one
sentencing fact-finding proceeding, or a desire to allow a single fact-finder to balance competing con-
siderations.
32. See Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103
HARV. L. REV. 530,532 (1989).
33. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1377-78 (1985) (arguing that jury verdicts serve a socializing function
that is not perfectly correlated with their accuracy).
34. Some have argued that the presumption of innocence does not apply to already-convicted
defendants at the sentencing stage. See Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. Rev.
1771, 1778 (2003). However, Blakely stands for the proposition that it does apply, at least as to the
establishment of facts that increase a defendant's sentencing exposure. Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 311-12 (2004).
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efficient maximization of one's own welfare, but we do not use it in this
sense; we assume that jurors are not driven in their decision making en-
tirely by self-interest, but at least in part by a sense of legal, civic, or
moral duty.35 Instead, we use the terms "rationality" and "accuracy" in-
terchangeably to describe decision making that reaches, to the greatest
extent possible in light of inevitable limits on jurors' cognitive proc-
esses, the result the law requires based on the evidence. Thus, a ra-
tional juror would vote to find the presence of an aggravating sentencing
factor if and only if the evidence supports that result beyond a reason-
able doubt.
The law recognizes, of course, that the strength of evidence and
credibility of witnesses is debatable, such that there may not be any sin-
gle "rational" outcome even on the most "objective" factual questions;
that is why appellate courts review jury verdicts on factual issues defer-
entially, reversing only when no reasonable jury could have come to the
result that was reached. Moreover, sentencing factors are not purely
"objective." Jurors will also be asked to make value judgments, which
obviously can vary among different, equally rational jurors. Nonetheless,
the biases we discuss may still be described as "irrational," even if they
only cause jurors to change what was already a subjective judgment call.
For instance, when different ways of framing questions trigger systematic
changes in outcomes, random variation among jurors' qualitative assess-
ments or normative judgments is unlikely to be the cause. Instead, the
wording of the question must be biasing jurors' conclusions. Distortions
in value judgments due to suggestive question framing or deliberation
structures may prevent the jury from reaching a result that truly repre-
sents the range of reasonable views present in a community.38
Producing "rational" or "accurate" outcomes in particular cases is,
however, not the only goal of criminal jury processes. Other important
35. See PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE vii (Cass Sunstein et al. eds., 2002).
36. Effective jury reform must acknowledge, and work around, cognitive limits. See Craig R.
Callen, Rationality and Relevancy: Conditional Relevancy and Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1243, 1244, 1248 (2003).
37. Id. at 1244-49.
38. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2144 (1998) (describing the
"growing consensus" that "both values and preferences are often constructed, rather than elicited, by
social situations"). Of course, this is not to say that value judgments that are representative of the
community are always "rational." Racial prejudice, for example, may be common in a particular
community, and may well bias a jury's value judgments as well as its factual conclusions. See, e.g., Er-
win Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the
Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 522-24 (1995). We do not focus on racial bias here,
however, believing that we could only give it short shrift in a short essay raising so many other issues,
and suspecting that procedural reforms to jury fact-finding processes may offer little hope of a solu-
tion. Extensive scholarship, however, addresses race and jury decision making. See, e.g., Samuel R.
Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review
of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003).
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considerations include the fairness of the justice system as a whole," as
well as the effect of jury service on jurors themselves and on society
more broadly. The jury has always played an important role in Ameri-
can democracy,4 and jury service is perhaps the only civic responsibility
(other than paying taxes) that is legally required of most adult Ameri-
cans. It is also the only way in which many Americans actively partici-
pate in government. One objective of jury reform, therefore, might be
the improvement of the process from the jurors' perspective, so that jury
service strengthens jurors' sense of civic membership and responsibility.
The jury also has an important symbolic role in the "ritual" of a criminal
42trial. The notion of facing one's peers gives critical moral legitimacy to
criminal trials -legitimacy that stems in part from the various traditions
surrounding the jury trial and deliberation process. 3 For these reasons,
although exploring ways to enhance the jury's democratic or cultural role
is not the primary objective of this article, we recognize the need to en-
sure that reforms do not undermine that role, and we shape our recom-
mendations accordingly.
We do not consider every possible reform that might plausibly im-
prove jury accuracy, but rather focus on identifying new solutions to
problems stemming specifically from jurors' involvement in finding sen-
tencing facts. Altering the size of juries, voting rules, and jury-selection
processes might arguably improve decision making if done properly, but45
those issues have been treated extensively elsewhere. We also do not
focus on the issue of jury nullification, because it is quite different in kind
from the other problems we address: nullification results not from cogni-
tive-processing problems that cause an inability to apply the law cor-
rectly, but from a deliberate rejection of the result the law requires.
However, we believe that Blakely may have significant consequences for
39. See Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE
L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985).
40. De Tocqueville wrote that "the jury is above all a political institution." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed., Anchor
Books, Doubleday & Co. 1969); see also Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 1099, 1153 (2005).
41. For instance, Jenia Iontcheva Turner has argued for an expansion of jury sentencing, as op-
posed to merely sentencing fact-finding, in part because citizens' engagement in democratic delibera-
tion on critical moral issues "revitalizes and improves political life as a whole." Jenia Iontcheva, Jury
Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 341 (2003); see also lontcheva Turner, supra
note 29, at 106-11 (arguing that Blakely provides an opportunity for state legislatures to consider im-
plementing jury sentencing).
42. See Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1376 (1971) (arguing that a trial is a "ritual" as much as it is an "objective search
for historical truth," and that the jury's role in that ritual is to "mediate between 'the law' in the ab-
stract and the human needs of those affected by it").
43. See Nesson, supra note 33, at 1357-69.
44. Projects with these goals already exist. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Principles for Juries and
Jury Trials (2005) (proposed), available at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf
(indicating the ABA's view on which jury reform issues are most pressing).
45. See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986).
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jury nullification, and specifically raises the new possibility of "sentenc-
ing nullification," an issue that merits further research.46
Finally, in considering whether to allocate certain decision-making
responsibilities to juries or instead to judges, it will be important to un-
derstand both sides of the comparison: what are juries' capacities and
limitations relative to those of judges? We draw such comparisons where
relevant, but primarily focus on juries and not on judges. Some of the
problems we discuss are specific to group behavior and do not apply to
trial court judges at all. However, we also discuss cognitive biases affect-
ing individual juror decision making that probably apply to some de-
gree-and often to an equal or even greater degree-to judges 7.4  Even
those biases shared equally by judges and juries are relevant to post-
Blakely policy debates for two reasons.
First, these debates should not be limited to the question of how to
allocate decision-making responsibilities between judges and juries, but
should also focus on how to improve and develop the capacities of those
decision makers. The allocation question may be constitutionally deter-
mined: Blakely means that if a state wants to maintain mandatory sen-
tencing guidelines, it will have no choice but to shift to Juries the respon-
sibility to find certain sentencing-related facts. Given that
constitutional fact, it should be an overriding policy priority to ensure
that juries can perform those tasks well. Because judges are less likely to
have wholly new responsibilities -although they will regain some of their
traditional discretion in systems that follow the Booker route-focusing
46. Jury nullification is today fairly uncommon. See Kaimipono David Wenger & David A.
Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 1115, 1130 (2003). But we speculate that a new form
of it might emerge after Blakely: sentencing-related findings that contravene the evidence. This could
result for a number of reasons: residual doubt or disagreement as to guilt on the underlying offense;
sympathy for a defendant or anger at the state combined with reluctance to acquit entirely; and jurors'
beliefs that the sentences for particular crimes are too high. Cf Kristin L. Sommer, Irwin A. Horowitz
& Martin J. Bourgeois, When Modern Juries Fail to Comply With the Law: Biased Evidence Processing
in Individual and Group Decision Making, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 309, 311 (2001)
(citing studies showing that "when people believe that their decisions may result in unfair (e.g., overly
punitive) outcomes for others, these decision makers may augment the importance of information
leading to particular (i.e., fair) conclusions"). On the other hand, the existence of the compromise
option of "sentencing nullification" might, we speculate, reduce the incidence of jury nullification at
the threshold guilt stage. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing the compromise
effect).
Although jury nullification is widely decried as lawless, many scholars have defended it, arguing
that it ensures that the jury's judgment truly reflects the community's judgment of the defendant's
moral culpability, gives a voice to disempowered minorities, and provides a check on abuses of gov-
ernment power. See, e.g., Wenger & Hoffman, supra, at 1138-43. Similar arguments might be made
(perhaps more effectively) in the sentencing context, wherein nullification might be seen as a check on
inflexible determinate sentencing systems that bar judges from tailoring sentences to the demands of
justice in individual cases.
47. W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 35, at 186, 206
("Judges are human and may reflect the same kinds of irrationalities as other individuals.").
48. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004); see also Nancy J. King & Susan R.
Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED SENT'G REP. 316,318 (2004).
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on improving the structures and processes by which judges find facts is
less urgent.
Second, even where similar problems afflict juries and judges, juries
may arguably offer more opportunity for successful reforms. Judges are
experts who tend to be confident in their abilities and to have developed
longstanding patterns, and may therefore, we speculate, be more resis-
tant to change. Moreover, separation of powers concerns may as a prac-
tical matter preclude political interference with judicial processes. Also,
a judge can instruct jurors to follow particular procedures, can control
the framing of the questions jurors are asked, and can exclude evidence
from the jury's consideration. There is no supervisor who can perform a
similar directing/gate-keeping role for judges, making it generally harder• 49
to implement reforms.
II. APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
In every state and in the federal courts, the rules of evidence appli-
cable at trial do not apply at judicial sentencing proceedings.' ° Indeed, at
federal sentencing, there is "no limit" on the evidence judges can con-
sider." As new procedures for jury fact-finding related to sentencing are
considered and designed in the wake of Blakely, one of the most impor-
tant issues will be whether and to what extent the rules of evidence must
or should apply to those proceedings. This Part addresses, in turn, the
constitutional limits on this policy choice; the extent to which the pruden-
tial rationales underlying the rules of evidence suggest that they should
apply at such proceedings; and the problem of prejudice resulting from
sentencing-related evidence being introduced at trial, which we think
weighs heavily in favor of bifurcation of proceedings. We principally re-
fer to the Federal Rules of Evidence, despite our focus on state systems,
because they have been the model for many states' rules of evidence."
A. Constitutional Requirements
Most of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and their state counterparts,
are not required by the Constitution even at trial, and thus presumably
would not be constitutionally required at sentencing-related jury pro-
49. See Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767,782 (2005).
50. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); see also United States v. Anaya, 32
F.3d 308, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1999).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000). The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines modify that rule, stating that courts
can consider any "relevant" evidence bearing "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (2004).
52. See Eric D. Green, Charles R. Nesson & Peter L. Murray, Preface to FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: WITH SELECTED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE, AND CASE
SUPPLEMENT xii (Eric D. Green et al. eds., 1997).
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ceedings even after Blakely.53 However, some restrictions on evidence
admission are grounded in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment and similar confrontation rights under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.54 For decades, the
Supreme Court had held that these clauses barred admission of hearsay
unless it bore certain indicia of trustworthiness roughly paralleling the
hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence. In 2004, in Craw-
ford v. Washington, the Court overruled these precedents, holding that
the right to confront witnesses is procedural in nature and cannot be sat-
56isfied by substantive guarantees of that evidence's reliability. Specifi-
cally, the Court held that the Constitution barred admission of testimo-
nial statements of a witness not appearing at trial unless he was
unavailable and the defendant had previously had an opportunity to
cross-examine him. 7 This rule overlaps considerably with the hearsay
rule and its exceptions, but its restrictions on testimonial hearsay are
generally stricter than most states' rules provide, while it does not restrict
nontestimonial hearsay at all.
58
Courts have generally held that the Constitution provides few limits
on the introduction of evidence at sentencing. In Williams v. New York,
the Supreme Court upheld a sentencing court's reliance on hearsay con-
tamed in a presentence investigative report. 9 The Court explained that
use of such reports "aid[s] a judge in exercising ... discretion intelli-
gently" and was consistent with hundreds of years of practice.6° Notwith-
standing the Court's subsequent decision in Specht v. Patterson, 6 holding
that confrontation rights were applicable in a proceeding to determine
whether a defendant should be sentenced as a "habitual sex offender,"
federal courts today uniformly hold that those rights do not apply to
62guidelines sentencing proceedings. Some lower courts had provided a
53. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,437 (2000) ("Congress retains the ultimate
authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not
required by the Constitution."). As Dickerson illustrates, other evidentiary restrictions besides the
hearsay rule may be constitutionally required. We focus, however, on those restrictions most relevant
to jury decision-making processes.
54. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1948) (reversing a contempt charge based on
secret grand jury evidence because individual had not been afforded the procedural safeguards re-
quired by due process of law).
55. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
56. 541 U.S. 36, 61-63 (2004).
57. Id. at 68.
58. The Court suggested that its holding would not have changed the outcomes of many of its
own previous decisions, id. at 57-59, but that many lower court decisions applying its precedents had
been wrongly decided. Id. at 63-65.
59. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
60. Id. at 245,246.
61. 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
62. Initially, after the Guidelines came into effect, there was a circuit split on this issue. See
United States v. Silverman, No. 90-3205, 1991 WL 179608 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d
1502 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane); United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled by
United States v, Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th 1992) (en bane); see also United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp.
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lesser degree of constitutional protection to defendants at sentencing,
applying a "reasonably trustworthy" standard to hearsay 63-but Craw-
ford has abrogated these precedents. And many courts do not limit the
use of hearsay at sentencing at all.64
Blakely may change this picture, however. The text of the Sixth
Amendment suggests that Confrontation Clause rights apply any time
the right to the jury trial applies-namely, during "all criminal prosecu-
tions. It is not certain that the Supreme Court will reach this conclu-
sion, however, as its construction of "criminal prosecutions" has varied
66based on which Sixth Amendment right is under consideration. We
take no position on this constitutional question. Nonetheless, in light of
the Apprendi/Blakely rationale that facts increasing the defendant's
maximum sentence exposure are functionally indistinguishable from
elements of the offense, it seems probable (although far from certain)
that Sixth Amendment confrontation rights apply at jury proceedings to
67determine sentencing facts. Importantly, the Confrontation Clause only
provides rights to defendants, so its application at sentencing will not re-
strict the defendant's own introduction of evidence.6
B. Prudential Considerations
Of course, policy concerns may support application of the rules of
evidence at sentencing-related jury proceedings, even if they are not con-
stitutionally required. This prudential analysis requires us to consider
why we exclude certain evidence at trial but not at sentencing: does it
1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that "Due Process does not pre-
vent use in sentencing of out-of-court declarations by an unidentified informant").
63. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Michaels, supra
note 34, at 38-39.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1137, 1181 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that "the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which might bar hearsay evidence from the guilt phase at trial, do not ap-
ply at sentencing").
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Adam Thurschwell, After Ring, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 97
(2002).
66. See Michaels, supra note 34, at 1780-81 (collecting cases and giving examples).
67. At least one court has essentially concluded as much in the death penalty context, after Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), applied Apprendi's requirement to aggravating factors in capital cases.
See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 483-84 (D. Vt. 2002). Fell held that all of the Rules of
Evidence must apply in capital sentencing proceedings, but that holding was based in part on the
"heightened reliability" considerations applicable in the death penalty context. Thurschwell, supra
note 65. In noncapital cases, it is not likely that courts would hold that all of the rules apply.
Notably, if the same Confrontation Clause standards are applied at sentencing as at trial, Crawford
suggests that testimonial portions of presentence reports may well be excluded. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) ("Involvement of government officers in the production of testi-
mony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse ....").
68. At capital sentencing proceedings, defendants have an affirmative right to introduce mitigat-
ing evidence unrestricted by the rule against hearsay, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595 (1978), but
this Eighth Amendment right does not appear to apply at noncapital proceedings. See Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment provides no right to indi-
vidualized sentencing in noncapital cases). Still, as discussed in Part II.B, infra, there may be strong
prudential reasons for introducing further asymmetries in application of the evidentiary rules.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
turn on juries' and judges' relative skills as decision makers, or on other
differences between trial and sentencing proceedings? Neither explana-
tion fully accounts for the current differential application of the rules of
evidence in the federal system: the rules do not apply at bench trials,
supporting the "judges are different" view;69 but they also do not apply at
jury capital sentencing, suggesting that it is sentencing (or at least capital
sentencing) that is different. Similarly, in many states, the rules of evi-
dence do not apply to jury proceedings in capital sentencing; in other
states, the rules do apply to the state's evidence but not to the defen-
dant's; and in a few, the rules nominally apply to all evidence, although
their application is in practice limited by constitutional considerations.
The rules of evidence are not monolithic, and so these rationales,
and their implications for application in federal and state courts post-
Blakely, may vary widely. We provide only general guidance rather than
a comprehensive rule-by-rule analysis.
At the outset, we note that whether particular categories of evi-
dence should be permitted at post-Blakely sentencing proceedings may
depend on one's view of the overarching purpose of the rules of evi-
dence. Consider the question whether jurors should be permitted to con-
sider a probation office's presentence investigation report. A proponent
of an economic model of evidence law that weighs the gains in accuracy
against the costs of gathering and weighing particular kinds of evidence,
for example, might argue that presentence reports, which are prepared
by experts, are likely to be reliable and to contain a great deal of useful
information, and that admitting them will actually reduce costs by obviat-
ing the need for live testimony. Meanwhile, a proponent of a model of
evidence law that emphasizes the traditional rituals of trial might object
that basing sentencing determinations on what jurors learn from the fine
print of a long government document hides critical aspects of the process
69. See Steven D. Clymer, Assessing Proposals for Mandatory Procedural Protections for Sen-
tencings Under the Guidelines, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 212,213 (2000).
70. "Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission
of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is out-
weighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury." 18
U.S.C. § 3593c (2000). It bears noting, however, that in one respect this is a more stringent standard
than the Rules of Evidence provide: potential for prejudice need not substantially exceed probative
value for evidence to be excluded. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 403.
71. See Robert Allan Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to Capital Sentencing Proceed-
ing: Theoretical and Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information, 60 UMKC L.
REV. 411,436 (1992) (noting that "the states differ markedly in their application of evidentiary rules to
the sentencing phase" of capital proceedings); Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center
Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1481 n.23 (2002); see also,
e.g., Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 243-44 (Md. 1995). Relaxation of restrictions on the defen-
dant's evidence is always required in capital cases because of the Eighth Amendment right to an indi-
vidualized sentence. See supra note 68.
72. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477,1543 (1999).
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from public view and undermines the legitimacy of the outcome.73 Thus,
the approach one brings to a question can often, unsurprisingly, dictate
the result. We try here to balance the many concerns that underlie evi-




The reasons the rules of evidence are not applied at judicial sentenc-
ing proceedings are likewise complex. In Williams v. New York, the Su-
preme Court emphasized both longstanding tradition and "sound practi-
cal reasons":
Rules of evidence... [were in part] designed to prevent tribunals
concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a particular offense from
being influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that the de-
fendant had habitually engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing
judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of
guilt.... Highly relevant-if not essential-to his selection of an
appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."
This reasoning turns not on the nature of the judge as a decision maker
per se, but rather on the nature of the sentencing decision. An important
illustration is found in Gregg v. Georgia, in which the Supreme Court re-
jected a defendant's challenge to the practice of substantially relaxing the
76rules of evidence during jury sentencing proceedings in capital cases.
The Court held that so long as evidence is not prejudicial to the defen-
dant, "it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We think it is desirable
for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it
makes the sentencing decision.
7
Arguably, the implication of the policy rationale embraced by these
cases is that juries who determine sentencing facts in noncapital proceed-
ings post-Blakely should be given access to as much information as pos-
73. See Nesson, supra note 33, at 1357 (arguing that the principal function of the rules of evi-
dence is to make the verdict acceptable to the public); Tribe, supra note 42, at 1391-92 (describing
procedural rules, including confrontation requirements, as "partly ceremonial or ritualistic," serving as
a reminder to the community of the principles it holds important").
74. Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
995, 1024 (1994).
75. 337 U.S. 241,246-47 (1949).
76. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
77. Id. at 203-04. Because Gregg concerned a defendant's challenge to the broad-ranging admis-
sion of evidence at sentencing, this policy argument cannot be understood solely in terms of the de-
fendant's Eighth Amendment right to an individualized sentence in capital proceedings. See supra
note 64; see also Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous Unadju-
dicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1249, 1254-63 (1993) (de-
scribing the evolution of the Supreme Court's "all relevant evidence" doctrine regarding capital sen-
tencing from one focused on the defendant's rights to a broader doctrine that permitted and even
encouraged broad admission of the prosecutor's evidence, subject to the requirement of notice to the
defendant and a bar on unfair prejudice). But see, e.g., United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (characterizing the suspension of the Federal Rules of Evidence at capital sentencing
as a reflection of the Supreme Court's "death is different" jurisprudence, which emphasizes the right
to an individualized sentence).
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sible-but Blakely's rejection of the elements/sentencing factors distinc-
tion may itself be inconsistent with the reasoning in Williams. Moreover,
many scholars have offered a different explanation: evidentiary rules do
not apply at sentencing because judges are more skilled at weighing the
value of particular kinds of evidence and avoiding prejudice. Indeed, if
juries are considerably less capable of processing and weighing certain
kinds of information, or more likely to be irrationally biased by it, there
is a strong argument for excluding information at sentencing-related
hearings by applying the rules of evidence.
Empirical studies, however, provide only mixed support for this
claim: juries are fairly competent at discounting the value of certain
kinds of evidence, while judges are not immune from biases and informa-
tion-processing problems of their own.s° In particular, the assumption
that jurors are incapable of appropriateW weighing hearsay evidence is
not borne out by social science research. Jurors have plenty of experi-
ence with similar processes in their daily lives. We all constantly evalu-
ate the credibility of information we receive, which generally entails
treating secondhand information as less trustworthy than firsthand in-
formation unless we have some good reason for putting faith in the more
distant source. So, to the extent that the Constitution permits it, permit-
ting the liberal use of hearsay at sentencing fact-finding hearings in front
of juries may make good sense. Indeed, scholars have argued in favor of
liberalizing the hearsay rules at trial as well.82
Scholars have reached varying conclusions as to jurors' capacity to
filter out irrelevant evidence. On the one hand, jurors should generally
78. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1177-78 (2001); Steven D. Clymer, supra note 69, at 213 (arguing
that the Federal Rules recognize that judges are "better equipped" to evaluate hearsay evidence than
criminal juries) (citing FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3)); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1256-57 (2005).
79. See Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 967, 969 (2003) (arguing that "over-valuation" concerns can only justify exclusion if the problem
is sufficiently extreme that "the truth-determination process is worse if the jurors hear the evidence
than if they do not"). We would modify Friedman's formulation: to justify exclusion, juries' over-
valuation must be significant enough that the added accuracy from admission is insufficient to offset
other disadvantages of admission.
80. See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 27 (1997) ("Although far fewer studies have been conducted
using judges [than using juries], few if any of them suggest judges are better able to base their deci-
sions squarely on legally admissible information.").
81. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 79, at 976; Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park & Steven D.
Penrod, Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1992);
Stephan A. Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 65 (1991); Peter Miene, Roger
C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN.
L. REV. 683 (1992). But see Seigel, supra note 74, at 1032-34 (criticizing these studies).
82. See Freidman, supra note 79, at 977-78; Kovera et al., supra note 81, at 722. These studies
provide empirical support for a view long professed by proponents of hearsay reform: that juries are
more capable of assessing the value of hearsay evidence than the current hearsay rules suppose. See,
e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1968).
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be fairly effective at identifying what information bears on a particular
issue: similar cognitive processes are again routine in daily life. On the
other hand, jurors are susceptible to "cognitive overload," a problem we
discuss in detail in Part IV. Here, we note only that reducing jurors' cog-
nitive burdens is one reason to impose rules, like the relevance require-
ment, that reduce the 4quantity of information with which jurors are
bombarded at hearings.
Moreover, juries' assessments of relevance may be distorted by
overreliance on the "expert" opinion of the judge. For example, they
may assume (unless they are instructed that the judge has no power to
exclude irrelevant testimony) that all evidence presented to them is rele-
vant in some way, and thus may not trust their own contrary judgments."
In addition, the introduction of irrelevant evidence imposes costs on theS 86
judicial system and on the parties involved. This concern may be espe-
cially relevant because a shift to jury fact-finding will inevitably increase
costs, and policymakers can be expected to search for ways to minimize
the strain on scarce resources. 8' Because inclusion of irrelevant evidence
by definition does not contribute to rational jury decision making (even
if it does not significantly harm it), and does not seem to contribute to
the other social and cultural purposes of jury trials,8 there is little to be
gained, and perhaps much to be lost, by eliminating the relevance rule at
sentencing-related jury proceedings.
Juries may be quite susceptible to emotional appeals, some of which.. . . 89.. .
might be unduly prejudicial. For this reason, one might justifiably ex-
clude evidence that carries a potential for prejudice substantially out-
weighing its probative value in sentencing-related jury proceedings. Ap-
plication of this rule might have the effect of excluding certain forms of
83. For a seminal work advocating deference to the jury's ability to determine factual relevance,
see Edmund M. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of
Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165, 165 (1929). See also JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 265 (1898).
84. Posner, supra note 72, at 1523.
85. Callen, supra note 36, at 1275-76.
86. Posner, supra note 72, at 1522-24. These costs may disproportionately burden criminal de-
fendants, who generally have fewer resources to acquire evidence. Cf Callen, supra note 36, at 1296.
87. See Part II.C infra.
88. The empowerment of jurors to make all relevance determinations might, in theory, increase
their sense of satisfaction with the trial process, but we doubt it. Cognitive fatigue and excess com-
plexity generally tends to decrease morale. See infra Part IV.A.
89. This has, at least, long been the conventional wisdom about juries, and seems to be borne out
by at least some practical experience. See, e.g., THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
144 (1935); Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179,
208 (1998); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75
CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (1987); Matthew L. Zabel, Advisory Juries and Their Use and Misuse in Federal
Tort Claims Act Cases, 2003 BYU L. REV. 185,214-15 (2003); see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional
Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 705 (1989) (criticiz-
ing judicial culture for inculcating judges with an ethic of complete dispassion). But see Neil Vidmar,
The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849, 884-85
(1998) (finding that mock juries and judges give similar damages for pain and suffering, undercutting
the assumption that judges' "legal training makes them less susceptible to emotional appeals").
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victim-impact evidence, for instance. 9° But different objectives might
lead to different conclusions about the relative susceptibility of judges
and juries to "prejudice." It might be reasonable, for instance, to trust a
group of lay people drawn from the community to make findings that are
"fair" or that reflect the community's values more than we trust a judge
to do the same.9' Moreover, when juries make sentencing judgment calls,
perhaps we want them to some degree to be influenced by emotions (al-
though not by certain kinds of emotional appeals, such as appeals to ra-
cial bias).92 Accordingly, whether rules designed to minimize "prejudice"
should apply (or, at least, how judges should apply them) might also turn
on what sort of determination is at issue: one for which factual "accu-
racy" is prized, or one for which we trust the jury's moral judgments.
The finding of certain sentencing facts may well necessitate some re-
laxation of the rules of evidence in order to avoid substantial new costs.
For instance, if Blakely is extended to include the defendant's criminal
history, 93 jury review of presentence reports could be far less costly than
live testimony on past crimes. Other factors, like drug quantity, are simi-
lar to factual determinations juries already regularly make, and do not
demand analogous relaxation.
One set of rules that will have to be modified, at least if proceedings
are bifurcated, are the restrictions on the introduction of character evi-
dence-specifically, the total bar on "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" be-.95
ing introduced to show criminal propensity. Criminal history is rou-
96tinely introduced for exactly that purpose at sentencing -it is greater
criminal propensity that justifies increasing the length of recidivists' sen-
90. Current capital-sentencing practice provides some insight into how victim-impact evidence
might be assessed. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment imposes no
categorical bar on victim-impact evidence, states are not obligated to allow it, and generally courts
may exclude such evidence (just like other forms of evidence) from the jury if it is unduly prejudicial.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also, e.g., United
States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 191 (D. Mass. 2004) (excluding memorial video of victim as
unduly prejudicial); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 751 (N.M. 1999) (applying the same balancing test,
but finding short video admissible); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 826-27, 829-30 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995) (applying balancing test to exclude certain victim impact evidence, including photographs of
victim and evidence regarding emotional impact).
91. See Seigel, supra note 74, at 1019-20; cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 253 (1949)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) ("In our criminal courts the jury sits as the representative of the commu-
nity .... A judge ... should hesitate indeed to increase the severity of such a community expres-
sion.").
92. See Stephen P. Garvey, "As The Gentle Rain From Heaven": Mercy In Capital Sentencing, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1042-43 (1996) (arguing that some degree of emotionalism is inevitable in sen-
tencing decisions, but that emotions can serve as useful guides to "what is morally right"); cf. Robert
P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 205, 205-06, 213-17 (2001) (re-
sponding to criticism of juries' emotionalism and irrationality by arguing for a more complex under-
standing of the jury's role).
93. See supra note 9.
94. See Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 615, 640-41 (2002).
95. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
96. See Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717,722 (1998).
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tences. Even if Blakely is not extended to require jury determination of
past criminal history, other "bad act" evidence will be important to en-
able juries to determine a defendant's "relevant conduct" and perhaps to
find such factors as racial bias. Although such evidence may run a sig-
nificant risk of prejudicing the jury, 97 its exclusion in such circumstances
can better be accomplished by applying the state equivalent of Rule 403S98
on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the character evidence rule has been
described as a legislative determination that certain evidence is per se
substantially more prejudicial than probative.99
There is another practical reason judges are not constrained by
rules of evidence: they are the ones who decide what evidence reaches
the jury, and they cannot keep information from themselves. I°° This
"gatekeeper" problem may mean that judges' and juries' relative capaci-
ties are less important than juries' absolute capacities: both judges and
juries may be susceptible to improper influence, but rules of evidence al-
low us to control that influence in the jury setting. Arguably, then, those
rules should apply to jury proceedings even if there is no practical way to
apply them in judicial proceedings. Relative capacities-and possibili-
ties of improvement through evidentiary limitations -might well influ-
ence the threshold question whether to entrust certain decisions to
judges or juries. If judges are far more capable of weighing certain evi-
dence than juries are, that argues in their favor; if both have similar inca-
pacities but the information can be kept from the jury, that argues in fa-
vor of jury proceedings. I°2
Legislatures must also consider whether evidentiary restrictions
should be applied equally to both parties. The rules of evidence applica-
ble at criminal trials already include numerous asymmetries that protect
defendants' rights. 1°3 There is a strong prudential argument that many of
97. See Friedman, supra note 79, at 979-80.
98. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence.").
99. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,476 (1948) ("The overriding policy of excluding
such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance
tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice."); 1A JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2, 1212 (1983).
100. See Bibas, supra note 78, at 1177.
101. A number of prominent judges and scholars have argued that the rules of evidence, or at
least some of them, should apply at judicial sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSE A.
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN FEDERAL COURTS 158 (1998); Jose A.
Cabranes, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go from Here?, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 208,
209 (2000); Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the
Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 302 (1994); Deborah Young, Untested Evidence: A Weak Foundation
for Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 63, 66 (1992).
102. See Saks, supra note 80, at 28.
103. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 405 (addressing the admissibility of character evidence); FED. R.
EVID. 609 (varying the balancing test for determining admissibility of prior convictions for impeach-
ment).
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the rules, especially hearsay and character evidence restrictions, should
not apply to the defendant's introduction of mitigating evidence. De-
terminate sentencing systems minimize the individualization of sentenc-
ing to an oft-criticized degree;' ° one way to soften their frequent harsh-
ness is to permit the defendant broad leeway to introduce mitigating
evidence. Defendants enjoy that leeway now in judicial proceedings, and
it would be unfortunate if Blakely paved the way for further erosion of
the sentencing system's accommodation of individual differences. In the
alternative, instead of adopting asymmetric rules-which might be politi-
cally unpopular-states that choose to commit mitigating factors to the
jury might opt to drop certain rules entirely.
Together, these considerations suggest that many of the rules of
evidence ought to apply at post-Blakely sentencing-related jury hearings.
The strongest cases for relaxing major rules pertain to the rule against
hearsay and the limitations on prior bad act evidence. Many of the other
differences between sentencing and trial proceedings can be accounted
for not by dropping rules of evidence wholesale but by applying them dif-
ferently, with an understanding that concepts like "probative value" and
"prejudice" are context-specific.
C. The Relevance Problem: An Argument for Bifurcation
Even if the rules of evidence do apply in full at jury proceedings re-
lated to sentencing after Blakely, a great deal of evidence that previously
would have been excluded at trial is nearly certain to be admitted. Much
evidence that is irrelevant to, or much more prejudicial than probative
of, guilt on the underlying offense is highly probative for sentencing pur-
poses, 05 such as "prior bad act" evidence. Such evidence might well dis-
tort jury decision making as to guilt, yet excluding it from a unitary pro-
ceeding would deprive the jury of essential sentencing-related evidence.
This dilemma argues compellingly for bifurcation of proceedings. In a
bifurcated proceeding, trial and deliberation on guilt would proceed as it
does now, with no sentencing-related information introduced. After the
jury voted to convict the defendant, it would then hear the evidence
needed for sentencing fact-finding.
104. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 101, at 5.
105. See, e.g., Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi,
82 N.C. L. REv. 621,680-84 (2004).
106. We assume that both phases of a bifurcated proceeding would involve the same jury, which
would help to minimize costs because evidence related to both trial and sentencing would not have to
be introduced twice and the jury selection process would not have to be repeated. In some cases,
however, a substantial delay between trial and sentencing might be necessary (for instance, to gather
sentencing-related information not available until after trial). In such situations it might be impracti-
cal to reconvene the same jury, for example if jurors have moved, fallen ill, died or otherwise become
unavailable. Most of the advantages of bifurcation discussed in this article are equally applicable re-
gardless of whether a new jury or the same jury is used. Moreover, in cases in which delay between
the stages is necessary for some reason, unified proceedings would necessarily be impracticable.
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It is very difficult to see how this "relevance problem" can be re-
solved without bifurcation. One possibility is to instruct jurors to use
certain evidence for sentencing but not guilt purposes, but limiting in-
structions are notoriously ineffective. In fact, they may be counterpro-
ductive because they draw jurors' attention to the evidence that is sup-
posed to be ignored.0 For this reason, courts have held, in ineffective
assistance of counsel cases, that it is reasonable for defense counsel to
decline to request a limiting instruction because the instruction would
call attention to unfavorable evidence.'9 Nor do balancing tests along
the lines of Federal Rule 403 solve the problem. Balancing might ex-
clude victim-impact statements, for instance, because of their exceptional
potential for prejudice and minimal probative value.109 But evidence that
might prejudice the jury in determining guilt is often highly probative of
the proper sentence, and would therefore not likely be excluded under
balancing rules that usually put a heavy burden on the party opposing
admission.1 Exclusion would also risk compromising the accuracy and
fairness of the sentencing determination.i
1
This relevance problem could be partially alleviated if defendants
are permitted to stipulate to certain facts they do not want the jury to
hear, or if the Supreme Court declines to require past criminal convic-
tions to be proven to the jury,112 but some problems would no doubt re-
main. Inevitably, under a "real offense" sentencing scheme, a great deal
of uncharged conduct, evidence of which would no doubt prejudice the
jury at the guilt phase, is critical to the sentence. To require defendants
to waive the right to contest these facts before the jury at sentencing as a
condition of avoiding such prejudice at trial would deeply undercut the
Sixth Amendment right Blakely established.
107. Lillquist, supra note 105, at 681-82; Posner, supra note 72, at 1520; see also Joel D. Lieber-
man & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explana-
tions for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677,685-91 (2000); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy
of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985). But see 1 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 105.03(1) (Joseph M. McLaugh-
lin ed., Matthew Bender & Co., 2d ed. 2005) (arguing that limiting instructions are effective).
108. See Liliquist, supra note 105, at 682 n.257 (collecting ineffective assistance of counsel cases).
109. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 452 (2003); Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact
Evidence and Argument After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1044-48 (1993).
110. Lillquist, supra note 105, at 684.
111. Id. at 691. Most states that employ jury sentencing in noncapital cases (Arkansas, Virginia,
Texas, and Kentucky) bifurcate the proceedings, but Missouri and Oklahoma do not. In Missouri,
lack of bifurcation has resulted in juries issuing sentences without knowing about defendants' criminal
history or other relevant aggravating factors; frustration with this system has led the state to abandon
jury sentencing in most cases. Randall R. Jackson, Missouri's Jury Sentencing Law: A Relic the Legis-
lature Should Lay to Rest, 55 J. Mo. B. 14, 14-15 (1999).
112. See supra note 9. In Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 n.5 (2005), the Supreme
Court recently stated in dictum that, even if Almendarez-Torres is eventually overruled, a defendant
who fears the prejudicial effect of the introduction of past criminal convictions at trial could waive his
right to a jury determination of criminal history.
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Bifurcation solves this problem by permitting evidence relevant to
sentencing to be admitted at sentencing-related proceedings and ex-
cluded from the initial trial phase. Capital sentencing procedures are bi-
furcated for this very reason. In Gregg v. Georgia, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court endorsed bifurcation of proceedings as the "best answer" to
the severe risk of prejudice caused by the introduction of sentencing-
related evidence in unitary proceedings."' The Court quoted the obser-
vation of the drafters of the Model Penal Code that bifurcation of jury
proceedings in capital cases would simply be "the analogue of the proce-
dure in the ordinary case when capital punishment is not in issue; the
court conducts a separate inquiry before imposing a sentence.
1 14
Moreover, bifurcation is at least a partial solution to a problem rec-
ognized by Justice O'Connor's Blakely dissent: some relevant evidence
is not available until after trial, for example, evidence of defendants' con-
tempt or perjury."' It also resolves Justice Breyer's concern that defen-
dants would be placed in a strategic bind at unitary proceedings because
contesting sentencing factors might be perceived as an admission of
guilt. 116 We explore additional advantages of bifurcation below.
Requiring a separate sentencing proceeding in front of a jury may
carry costs in time and resources.118 In Kansas, however, a state that has
already adopted bifurcated proceedings, the sentencing phase has aver-
aged just an hour in length. 9 Moreover, much of the same evidence
would also be introduced in unitary trials, and so to a considerable de-
gree the cost problem is inherent in post-Blakely jury fact-finding regard-
less of whether proceedings are bifurcated. And today, as noted
above, sentencing proceedings conducted by judges are already per-
formed separately from the trial. There might be other ways to minimize
the costs of bifurcation. For example, courts could permit "sentence bar-
gaining," bargaining regarding disputed sentencing facts, or waiver of
jury fact-finding after conviction.
Even if bifurcation remains costlier than the alternative of unitary
proceedings in which juries decide both guilt and sentencing facts at
once, bifurcation remains the best approach for court systems that
113. 428 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1976).
114. Id. at 191 (quoting ALl, Model Penal Code § 201.6, cmt. 5, 74-75 (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1959)).
115. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 319 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 557-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
118. See Jackson, supra note 111, at 15 (arguing that jury sentencing should simply be abolished);
Lillquist, supra note 105, at 689; see also Jacqueline E. Ross, Unanticipated Consequences of Turning
Sentencing Factors into Offense Elements: The Apprendi Debate, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 197, 200 (2000)
(discussing additional problems with bifurcated proceedings).
119. See lontcheva Turner, supra note 29, at 110.
120. Where defendants are acquitted, bifurcation would save costs by making sentencing unneces-
sary. See Vidmar, supra note 89, at 871 (1998) (arguing that civil trial bifurcation makes damages pro-
ceedings unnecessary, thereby increasing efficiency). Because criminal acquittals are rare, this effect
would be fairly minor.
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choose to shift sentencing fact-finding responsibilities from judges to ju-
ries. Bifurcation is the only practical solution to the evidence-admission
dilemma. Society may be forced to accept that the right to a jury trial
recognized in Apprendi carries inevitable costs in terms of resources and
efficiency, but that we value that right for different reasons, and that this
value outweighs the costs associated with more onerous procedural re-
quirements. As Justice Scalia wrote in Apprendi, the Sixth Amendment
jury-trial guarantee "has never been efficient; but it has always been
free. 121
III. FRAMING SENTENCING-RELATED QUESTIONS
The answers jurors and other individuals reach are heavily influ-
enced by the way questions are posed to them. Overly numerous or
poorly phrased or ordered questions and answer choices can exacerbate
various kinds of cognitive biases. Blakely will increase the number, and
change the type, of questions presented to jurors. These changes, conse-
quently, will make understanding juror biases, and shaping questions to
avoid them, particularly important in the years ahead.
A. Anchoring and Scale Problems
Individuals and groups tend to reach erratic and arbitrary conclu-
sions when they are asked to provide some measure of the seriousness of
wrongdoing but are not provided a bounded scale and, when appropri-
ate, relevant points of comparison.' 22 These problems will likely manifest
themselves in post-Blakely sentencing proceedings when juries are asked
questions that are open-ended, lack reference points for comparison, or
123provide misleading benchmarks.
In general, people make judgments based on adjusting from a base
anchor, and if the anchor is absent or poorly chosen, it may distort deci-
sion making. 24 For instance, mock juries reach remarkably consistent re-
sults (even across demographic categories) when they are asked to rank
different scenarios of wrongdoing, relative to one another, in terms of
121. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 755 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) ("It may be true that a judge can dispose of a ... criminal charge, more expeditiously and
more cheaply than a jury. 'But such trifling economies as may result have not generally been thought
sufficient reason for abandoning our great constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting free-
dom....' (quoting Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,216 (1958)).
122. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1157-
59 (2002); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Informa-
tion Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962,976 (2005).
123. To some degree, these problems also affect judges, although, as we discuss further below,
there is reason to believe judges' greater experience alleviates some of these biases.
124. See Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 29, at 765.
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the degree of outrageousness of the behavior.' 25 But when asked to at-
tach dollar values to the degree of wrongfulness, this agreement dissolves
entirel Y, and awards chosen for the same set of facts are widely diver-
gent. That is, when jurors are given an open-ended dollar scale of zero
to infinity without any points of comparison along that scale, they are
forced to choose numbers relatively arbitrarily. Likewise, when given a
range but no relevant points of comparison, people also reach quite arbi-
127trary results, often picking a point around the middle of the range.
Furthermore, in choosing an anchor, juries tend to be highly suscep-
tible to suggestion. For instance, if a civil plaintiff's attorney asks for a
higher amount, mock juries tend to give a higher amount, even when the
facts are otherwise identical. 28 Similarly, ordering effects can affect
criminal jury verdicts: mock juries "tend to lean toward the verdict op-
tions with which their consideration of verdicts began," thus convicting
on more serious offenses if they considered a more serious offense first.
Sometimes responses to suggestion may be unexpected-jurors told not
to focus on a particular factor may in fact be drawn to focus on it."3
Although mock jury studies may not adequately replicate the deci-
sion-making processes of real-world jurors, 3t anchoring and ordering ef-
fects are also found in non-jury-related studies, providing support for the
notion that they play an important role in human cognition in a variety of
contexts. For individuals asked to make a numerical estimate, the mere
mention of a number influences the response even when that number has
little or nothing to do with the question that has been posed. 32 Contin-
gent valuation studies show that people value things, like environmental
125. See Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage, Erratic
Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 35, at 31, 34-36 (concluding that "[j]udgments of intent to
punish.., evidently rest on a bedrock of moral intuitions that are broadly shared in society"); see also
Sunstein et al., supra note 38, at 2077-78, Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, supra note
122, at 1157-59.
126. Kahneman et al., supra note 125, at 40-41. But see Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations
and Tort Reform: Reforming the Remedy, Re-Balancing the Scales, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1391-95
(2004) (criticizing this study's methodology).
127. Sunstein et al., supra note 38, at 2078. Giving a range, for example, by setting a fixed cap on
punitive damages, may actually increase average awards if the cap is high because the cap can serve as
an anchor. See Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497,1520-21 (2003).
128. Sunstein et al., supra note 38, at 2109 & n.144 (citing studies); see Saks, supra note 80, at 47-
48; Vidmar, supra note 89, at 886 (arguing that the anchor effect disappears where the attorney's re-
quest is so high as to be viewed as plainly unreasonable); Vidmar, supra note 126, at 31-32 (arguing
that the presence of a countervailing anchor presented by the defense reduces bias).
129. Saks, supra note 80, at 34 (citing Jeff Greenberg et al., Considering the Harshest Verdict First:
Biasing Effects on Mock Juror Verdicts, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 41 (1986)). Saks
argues that these ordering effects result from the harsher offense serving as an anchor. Id. at 25.
130. For instance, one study found that instructing jurors not to increase the size of their verdict in
order to punish and deter the defendant increased verdict size; references to punishment and deter-
rence apparently suggested that the defendant's conduct was especially blameworthy. Shari Seidman
Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts,
and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513,535 (1992).
131. See generally Vidmar, supra note 126, at 7.
132. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 1048.
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resources, differently depending on the order of the questions asked,
13
1
while other studies show that auditors' assessments vary based on the or-. 134
der of evidence they receive. And individuals' susceptibility to sugges-
tion extends beyond those situations requiring quantitative judgments.
Rather, suggestive phrasing sharply influences individuals' answers to all
kinds of questions-for instance, public policy questions posed on
135 136polls, or personal choices about a course of action in their own lives.
Studies of jury sentencing in those states that allow it demonstrate
that similar problems exist in the criminal sentencing context. Jury sen-
tences are significantly more erratic than judicial sentences. 13  One ex-
planation is jurors' lack of experience-jurors essentially consider each
case in a vacuum, while judges can use previous cases as points of com-. 138
parison. Harshness, as well as unpredictability, may be a function of,-- 131
inexperience, as jurors may "overreact" to routine offenses. In addi-
tion to their experience advantage, judges are also permitted to consider
sentencing statistics (where available) as well as the sentences given to140
coconspirators in the same case. Such information is kept from juries.
133. See Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 108 ("When asked for
their willingness to pay to preserve visibility in the Grand Canyon, people offer a number five times
higher when this is the first question than when it is the third question.").
134. See Sunita S. Ahlawat, Order Effects in Memory for Evidence in Individual Versus Group
Decision Making in Auditing, 12 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 71, 71-72 (1999) (reviewing studies). Inter-
estingly, these ordering effects appear to be reduced by group deliberation processes, and that experi-
ence with a process may in fact magnify these effects, suggesting that in terms of the "recency bias" in
evidence processing, if not in question-ordering, juries may have an advantage over judges. Id. at 73-
74,84-85.
135. See, e.g.. Michael J. Hiscox, Through a Glass and Darkly: Framing Effects and Individuals'
Attitudes Toward International Trade (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.
edu/-hiscox/HiscoxGlassDarkly.pdf.
136. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1590 (2004) ("When
people [considering undergoing a risky medical procedure] are told, 'Of those who have this proce-
dure, 90 percent are alive after five years,' they are far more likely to agree to the procedure than if
they are told, 'Of those who have this procedure, 10 percent are dead after five years."').
137. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886-90 (2004).
138. See Jeffrey Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases among Experts, 2004 AM. L. &
ECON. ANN. MEETING at 37 (2004) (observing, in the context of insurance negotiations, the compara-
tive cognitive advantages of experts), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1059&cortrex=alea. This problem is exacerbated by rules of evidence that "blindfold" sentencing ju-
ries in most states from considering useful information including typical sentencing ranges. See
Iontcheva, supra note 41, at 366 (arguing that this lack of information partially explains wide variation
in jury sentences); King & Noble, supra note 137, at 913-16 (arguing that lack of information causes
Virginia jurors to give harsher sentences than judges do); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing
Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1376-77 (1999). An Arkansas judge has observed that jurors, who
serve for six months, tend to impose more predictable sentences as they gain experience. King & No-
ble, supra note 137, at 931-32; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, The Cognitive Compo-
nents of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 462-63 (2003) (demonstrating that provision of points
of comparison significantly affects mock juries' sentences of imprisonment).
139. King & Noble, supra note 137, at 914. The risk that a jury will issue an excessive sentence is
often used as leverage by prosecutors in plea bargaining, since in some circumstances entering into a
plea bargain is the only way to get a judicial sentence. Id. at 895.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268, 1273-75 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that judges
may depart downward under the Federal Guidelines in order to achieve proportionality among cocon-
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Blakely does not require that juries issue sentences. Most likely, in
states that follow Blakely rather than the route suggested by Booker, ju-
ries will make particular findings of fact that will then be "translated"
into a sentence by a judge applying sentencing guidelines. Juries will
thus not have to translate punitive intent into a quantified form of pun-
ishment, but are nonetheless likely to experience anchoring and adjust-
ment problems. Jurors asked whether to characterize a particular of-
fense as aggravated will typically have little experience evaluating other
instances of the same offense. To most law-abiding citizens, for instance,
almost any homicide case taken in isolation might seem "excessively bru-
tal" or "deliberately cruel., 14' Thus, juries will tend to be arbitrary and
perhaps overly severe in their assessments of aggravating factors if no
points of comparison are provided.
Likewise, juries that are asked to make quantitative judgments re-
garding sentencing factors-for instance, determinations of drug quan-
tity-may not face precisely the same anchoring and adjustment prob-
lems that juries in punitive damage cases do. Drug quantity
determinations are questions of historical fact, not normative judgments,
and presumably the parties will have introduced some evidence as to
quantity, so that the jury's job is less of a "stab in the dark.' ' 142  But in
cases in which jurors simply have no idea what the proper finding is-for
instance, if they do not remember or did not understand the relevant tes-
timony- they will likely be quite influenced by the ranges they are given,
tending to pick a point arbitrarily around the middle of the range. This
may be more likely where juries are faced with difficult quantitative de-
143terminations, such as financial loss in a securities fraud case.
On the bright side, as discussed above, juries do perform consis-
tently when asked to rank the relative seriousness of different instances
of wrongdoing. Consequently, juror performance in sentencing fact-
finding might well be improved by providing jurors a set of sample cir-
cumstances to which they can compare a given case. For instance, if a
defendant is convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and the ques-
spirators); lontcheva, supra note 41, at 370 (some courts provide judges with regional sentencing statis-
tics). But see Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 29, at 953-56 (arguing that judicial sentencing is af-
fected by cognitive biases including anchoring and adjustment problems). On the need to improve
sentencing information systems, which can provide judges with real-time access to sentencing statistics,
see Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems,
Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1376-78 (2005).
141. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as much in the capital sentencing context. See
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988) ("[An ordinary person could honestly believe that
every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is 'especially heinous."'). In Maynard, the Court
held that such language is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, unless ac-
companied by jury instructions specifically defining the terms. Id. at 360-66. However, this Eighth
Amendment rationale appears to be limited to the capital sentencing context. See id. at 361-62 (ex-
plaining that unique vagueness standards apply in capital sentencing, wherein arbitrariness poses spe-
cial constitutional concerns); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,428-29 (1980).
142. Kahneman et al., supra note 125, at 31.
143. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 762 (2005).
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tion is the defendant's role in the conspiracy, the jury could be provided
with a few short descriptions of fictional cases that exemplify the relative
degree of culpability for different members of a drug conspiracy.14 So
long as the descriptions are concise and not overly numerous, they are
unlikely to substantially overload jurors, but will instead help the jury to
understand the characterizations it must make.45
B. Tendency to Pick the Middle Option
Individuals and groups, when presented with three or more options,
tend to pick the middle option more than would be expected if they were• 1146
acting rationally. Mock juries presented with the option of convicting
on a lesser-included offense quite frequently take that option, generating
a "compromise effect.' ' 147  First, conviction on some offense becomes
more likely; that is, the defendant's odds of a complete acquittal decline.
That, of course, could be the outcome of completely rational decision
making. For instance, if the evidence in a certain case is sufficient to
support a manslaughter conviction but not a murder conviction, a ra-
tional jury presented with only a murder charge will acquit, while a ra-
144. As discussed in Part I, supra, in discussing rules of evidence in jury sentencing states, some
critics of restrictive rules of evidence argue that sentencing juries should have more access to real-
world data about sentencing in other cases. For juries merely charged with finding facts at the sen-
tencing stage rather than issuing sentences, however, no statistics or comprehensive sentencing infor-
mation systems yet exist that would provide particularly useful guidance. But see Miller, supra note
140, at 1356-57 (proposing increased transparency in sentencing through the development of sentenc-
ing information systems). We suggest the use of fictional cases for comparison purposes-although
they may be loosely based on real cases -because they may be easier than real cases to tailor and sim-
plify, allowing jurors to draw the necessary comparisons without being overwhelmed by details.
145. Sunstein suggests that in the punitive damages context this approach is not realistic because
either just a few examples will be provided and the choice among them will be arbitrary, or too many
examples will be provided and jurors will suffer cognitive overload. See Sunstein, Predictably Incoher-
ent Judgments, supra note 122, at 1181-82. We expect that such problems would be less serious in
post-Blakely proceedings because jurors need only compare the defendant's conduct to other instances
of the same statutory offense. Because jurors are not the ones that issue the ultimate sentence (unlike
punitive damages juries), they are not responsible for achieving coherence across offense categories;
the legislature or sentencing commission is. So the only examples necessary would be examples of the
same offense committed in different ways.
Sunstein also argues that the selection of comparison cases could be manipulated to bias the jury in
a particular direction. See id. This is a genuine concern, but we believe it could be alleviated if the
examples chosen to illustrate particular sentencing factors are standardized, perhaps by the state sen-
tencing commission, rather than left for parties or judges to decide in particular cases. Although fash-
ioning such examples would be a significant task under state guidelines schemes, which normally do
not involve an inordinate number of different sentencing factors, preparing standard forms is a realis-
tic possibility. Still, it might be difficult to anticipate all the possible variations that specific cases could
pose, so judges could be given discretion to adjust the examples in cases in which the standard forms
are clearly inadequate.
146. This effect may be amplified by compromises among disagreeing jurors during deliberation,
although deliberation also sometimes induces polarizing effects. See infra Part V.
147. See Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 286-87 (2001);
Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Twersky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decisionmaking,
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 288 (1996); Lillquist, supra note 105, at 654-60; Rachlinski & Jourden, supra
note 138, at 462; Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of
Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211,212-14 (1972).
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tional jury that is also presented the option of convicting on manslaugh-
ter will do so. Second, however, conviction of the greater offense be-
comes less likely-and that result lacks a similar rational explanation.1
8
If the evidence supports a murder conviction, juries ought to issue a
murder conviction regardless of whether a manslaughter option is avail-
able. The fact that they do so less often suggests that juries are acting in
at least one of two irrational ways: either the absence of a manslaughter
option is convincing juries to convict on murder charges even when the
evidence only supports a manslaughter conviction, or the presence of
that option is causing them to doubt the sufficiency of the murder evi-
dence and to pick the middle option instead.
Similarly, when a greater offense is added to the options presented
to mock juries, the chance of an acquittal on all charges decreases.
4
1
That outcome is also irrational. If a defendant is charged only with man-
slaughter and, in the jury's assessment, the evidence does not support the
charge, the defendant should be acquitted. That picture does not change
if the defendant is also charged with murder; the evidence still supports
neither offense. In Lillquist's terminology, the addition of the greater of-
fense creates a "decoy effect": the presence of a third option C that in-
creases the range of choices available distorts the choice between options
A and B by making B (which is closer to C, the "decoy") seem like it
must be a better choice than the outlier, A.5 Similar decoy and com-
promise effects have been demonstrated in mock jury sentencing, 5' as
well as in other contexts.
1 52
148. See Lillquist, supra note 105, at 655-59; Vidmar, supra note 147, at 215.
149. See Lillquist, supra note 105, at 657-58; see also Kelman et al., supra note 147, at 290-95
(showing same effect when a third, more severe offense option is added to two existing options).
150. Lillquist, supra note 105, at 654. These mock jury studies are consistent with real world ex-
perience. See id. at 663. An understanding of jurors' tendency to pick the middle option is the very
reason that defense lawyers often request lesser-included-offense instructions. See id. If juries be-
haved rationally, such instructions could only harm the defendant: a jury would convict of the greater
offense regardless of the instruction if the evidence supported it, and otherwise would acquit entirely
absent the instruction.
151. See Kelman et al., supra note 147, at 296-97 (finding that the addition of sentencing option C
that was similar to B made subjects more likely to choose B than A, apparently because it made B,
being closer to another option, appear more reasonable).
152. See Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box? The Cost of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 601, 621-25 (2003) (demonstrating compromise effects in negotiators' choices); Itamar
Simonson & Amos Twersky, Choice in Context.- Tradeoff Context and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J.
MARKETING RES. 281, 290-92 (1992) (showing that given a choice among multiple product options,
consumers tend to choose the middle of the line). Compromise effects may explain the otherwise
"surprising" fact that civil juries are more likely to hold a defendant liable in a unitary trial than in the
liability phase of a bifurcated proceeding, while juries in the damage phase of bifurcated proceedings
tend to issue larger judgments than do juries in unitary trials. Saks, supra note 80, at 33-34; Vidmar,
supra note 89, at 872-73. A unitary civil trial essentially presents three options to the jury (no liability,
liability with low damages, and liability with high damages), while bifurcated proceedings present two
separate, simpler choices on liability and damages; in the unitary trial, juries tend to pick the middle
option. See Vidmar, supra note 89, at 871-73.
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C. Restructuring and Special Verdict Forms
Although decoy and compromise effects can influence traditional
jury decision making when multiple alternative charges are presented to
the jury, their prevalence will likely greatly increase if juries, as a conse-
quence of Blakely, are employed at the sentencing stage. Depending on
how special verdict forms are crafted, sentencing-stage juries in virtually
every case may be presented with multiple-choice questions-sometimes
many such questions. And because the same actor will now decide both
guilt and sentencing factors, these effects may infect threshold guilt de-
terminations even when there is only one charge, since juries could con-
flate the guilt and sentencing inquiries and, for instance, compromise by
convicting but making sentencing determinations that favor the defen-
dant.
The cognitive tendencies of jurors raise a number of policy ques-
tions. First, should proceedings be bifurcated, such that the initial deci-
sion regarding guilt remains a binary decision?.1 3 We argued in favor of
bifurcation in Part II, and decoy and compromise effects provide another
reason to endorse it. In a unitary proceeding, if a jury is asked both
whether a defendant committed an underlying offense in the first place,
and whether that offense was aggravated by the presence of one or more
sentencing factors, the mere asking of the sentencing-related question
may increase the likelihood that jurors behaving irrationally will convict
on the underlying offense.'
Second, if proceedings are not bifurcated, should sentencing factors
be presented to jurors as separate questions in the same proceeding, or
should they be incorporated in the charge just like other elements of the
offense, thereby presenting a binary choice? Under the former ap-
proach, a jury could decide that a defendant possessed some amount of
cocaine, for instance, and hence merited conviction for cocaine posses-
sion, and then proceed to answer the question how much cocaine he pos-
sessed. Under the latter approach, if a defendant were charged solely
with possessing fifty grams of cocaine, and the jury found that he pos-
sessed forty-nine grams, he would be acquitted entirely. Conviction for a
lesser amount would only be an option if a lesser-included offense option
was also provided. The choice between these two approaches could be
decided systematically as a policy (or constitutional ..) matter, or it could
153. See Lillquist, supra note 105, at 683--84 (arguing that in jury sentencing states, bifurcation is
essential to avoid distortion of the initial guilt inquiry); Vidmar, supra note 89, at 871 (noting that bi-
furcation arguably makes civil jury proceedings more structured and rational).
154. See Vidmar, supra note 89, at 871-72. Although judges presented with multiple sentencing
options may also be subject to decoy and compromise effects, these effects at least do not taint the
guilt determination when the two determinations are made by different actors.
155. The Blakely line does not settle whether facts that must be proven to the jury must also be
included in the indictment. In Apprendi, although avoiding the question, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that there may be no such requirement in state cases, because the right to a grand jury indict-
ment has never been applied against the states. 530 U.S. 466,477 n.3 (2000).
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be left to the parties to argue for particular ways of framing the question
in individual cases-much the way prosecutors and defense counsel to-
day make arguments concerning whether to include a lesser-included of-
fense instruction.
Third, unless the all-or-nothing "elements" approach described
above is adopted, some form of "special verdict form" will probably have
to be submitted to the jury, regardless of whether proceedings are bifur-
cated. 116 How should the questions on these forms be formulated? Be-
cause of the decoy effect, prosecutors would have a strong interest in
adding options to the form that suggest that the offense is more aggra-
vated than they can reasonably prove, while defendants would want as
many mitigating options as possible. It is important to prevent options
from being included on special verdict forms that are unsupportable by
the evidence. For this reason, the use of standard forms that list several
possible ranges of drug quantities (or that list several analogous possibili-
ties for other sentencing factors), although administratively convenient,
carries dangers. It is not enough to say that judges will throw out jury
conclusions if the evidence does not support them, for the power of the
decoy effect is not that it convinces jurors to pick the decoy, but rather
158that it distorts their choices among the other options.
Thus, if a multiple-choice special verdict form is provided, the an-
swer choices for each question should be limited to the range of options
for which the parties have argued and, for the upper end of the range, for
which the state has introduced evidence that is minimally sufficient to
sustain a jury verdict. This will require tailoring by the judge, perhaps
based on competing submissions of questions and answers by the parties,
at the end of the trial. One alternative approach would be to allow jurors
to fill in blanks as to quantitative assessments, rather than providing
choices that could distort jury decision making. This approach carries
the risk that in cases where jurors do not understand or remember the
relevant evidence, they would be left completely at sea and pick a num-
ber out of thin air (or by simply following the figure alleged in the in-
156. Such forms have in fact been in use in many districts since Blakely was decided, and in Kan-
sas (and possible other states) before that. Indeed, special verdict forms were sometimes used even
before Apprendi at judges' discretion, but in most circuits these have been deemed only advisory. See
Colleen Murphy, Jury Factfinding of Offense-Related Sentencing Factors, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 41, 42
(1992); see also M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines after Blakely and Booker: The
Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for Juries. 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 574 (2005).
157. For example, suppose a defendant testifies that the quantity of drugs at issue was thirty
grams, while the prosecution offers witnesses wh o testify that the quantity was sixty grams. Either
thirty, sixty, or an amount between those two options might be a rational outcome depending on
credibility judgments. Fifteen grams and one hundred grams are not rational outcomes, but the de-
fense and prosecution, respectively, would presumably want those choices on the form.
158. For example, in the hypothetical above, the reason the prosecutor wants a one-hundred-
gram option is not because he wants a one-hundred-gram finding (perhaps because he knows the
judge would throw out such a result), but because he thinks the option will convince or otherwise
cause the jurors to pick the sixty-gram option more often than they otherwise would. Furthermore,
judges cannot correct jury mistakes in defendants' favor.
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dictment). But it is not necessarily better to have the jury choosing from
multiple-choice options in that circumstance, and in any event the defen-
dant would enjoy some protection from wholly arbitrary outcomes: jury
findings unsupported by the evidence could be rejected by the judge, and
sentences based on figures higher than that alleged in the indictment may
be constitutionally barred.
IV. REDUCING AND MANAGING COMPLEXITY
Perhaps the most significant and widely raised argument against
shifting sentencing fact-finding to juries is the problem of complexity:
sentencing guidelines schemes involve so many factors and possible out-
comes that juries are likely to be overwhelmed with their new tasks. As
Justice Breyer characterized it in his Apprendi dissent:
There are, to put it simply, far too many potentially relevant sen-
tencing factors to permit submission of all (or even many) of them
to a jury. As the Sentencing Guidelines state the matter,
"[a] bank robber with (or without) a gun, which the robber kept
hidden (or brandished), might have frightened (or merely
warned), injured seriously (or less seriously), tied up (or simply
pushed) a guard, a teller or a customer, at night (or at noon), for
a bad (or arguably less bad) motive, in an effort to obtain money
for other crimes (or for other purposes), in the company of a few
(or many) other robbers, for the first (or fourth) time that day,
while sober (or under the influence of drugs or alcohol), and so
forth." 59
State guidelines are less complex than the federal guidelines, but that is
not saying much-state sentencing schemes still involve numerous and
diverse sentencing factors. This complexity is compounded by the fact
that certain individual sentencing factors are likely to be particularly
multifaceted and difficult to determine. Two examples include the calcu-
lation of loss from economic crimes and the evaluation of a defendant's
role in a conspiracy; the latter task has often required sentencing courts
to hold "minitrials" with physical evidence and witness testimony just to
determine the portion of a conspiracy for which a conspirator should be
held responsible.
Complexity raises serious problems for jury involvement at the sen-
tencing stage. Complicated structures and excessive information can
cripple decision making. And a shift from judges to juries would magnify
the problems caused by guidelines' existing complexity for two reasons.
First, the predominant "passive jury" model robs jurors of the tools they
need to process information and maintain effort levels. Second, over-
loaded jurors are more likely to give up and rely on others, creating a vi-
159. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 29, at 751.
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cious cycle in which they fall even farther behind-a problem that has to
date been ignored by jury reform literature but will demand attention
post-Blakely. An essential aspect of post-Blakely jury reform-an aspect
so important that it should be a prerequisite to any legislative decision to
shift sentencing fact-finding responsibility to the jury-is to devise means
both to reduce the complexity of juries' tasks and to give juries the best
possible tools for managing complexity.
A. Sentencing Complexity and Cognitive Overload
One of the obvious effects of increased jury involvement at the sen-
tencing stage is that it will multiply the tasks facing criminal juries: in
addition to their guilt-determination responsibility, they will be required
to apply a laundry list of sentencing factors including many different
types of questions, some of which will be quite difficult and evidence-
intensive. This heightened responsibility will increase the cognitive bur-
dens on jurors in two ways. First, it will make their ultimate decision-
making process structurally complex because they must balance multiple
discrete tasks at once. Second, it will greatly increase the amount of evi-
dence they are expected to absorb and process during courtroom pro-
ceedings.
The structural complexity problem is a new difficulty in the criminal
setting,1 61 except perhaps in the very most complex multidefendant, mul-
ticharge trials (which themselves will grow exponentially more complex
if juries are involved in finding sentencing facts). Even civil juries in anti-
trust or other highly technical cases, while they may be forced to process
a great deal of information, 162 usually only face two distinct questions (li-
ability and damages, occasionally with differentiated types of damages).
In any event, even if complexity is already a problem in a few cases, it is
safe to say that neither the criminal nor civil jury system in the United
States has ever before seen the kind of across-the-board complexity-
that is, in which ordinary cases present a large number of questions-that
sentencing fact-finding responsibility would bring. The magnitude of this
effect will depend on whether states shift all sentencing fact-finding to
the jury, or only aggravating factors; whether juries are required to hear
criminal history evidence; and whether Congress eventually decides to
shift application of the far more complicated federal guidelines to juries.
161. See Vidmar, supra note 89, at 871.
162. We are more concerned here, because they are more relevant and newer problems post-
Blakely, with "structural complexity" and the problem of the magnitude of information provided to
jurors than with the oft-noted difficulties posed by technical subject matter and competing expert tes-
timony, although these of course remain significant problems. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1074 (3d Cir. 1980); Friedman, supra note 79, at 982-86. But see Hans
& Albertson, supra note 127, at 1510-11; Vidmar, supra note 89, at 857-66 (observing that empirical
evidence does not consistently demonstrate these difficulties).
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But even if the answer to all of these questions is no, the likely effect will
be significant.
Even if juries' information processing and decision skills remained
constant as complexity and information burdens increased, we would ex-
pect the overall reliability of jury outcomes to decrease. The unreliabil-
ity of jury decision making increases exponentially with the number of
different questions presented. 16  More ominously, however, jurors' skills
will not remain constant. "[C]omplex structures reduce performance on
complex tasks" as a general matter.1 6 Specifically, increased difficulty
and complexity of tasks, especially when combined with a significant on-
slaught of information, can trigger "cognitive overload," a state that se-
165verely impairs cognitive processes. Jurors, like all individuals, are sub-
ject to this effect.6 Cognitive overload has a neurological basis:
assigning too many tasks to the cognitive processing portions of the brain
means that the brain will perform some tasks through impulse rather•. 167
than cognition. Thus, the brain is more likely to rely on preconceived
or subconscious notions than to think problems through.
In particular, cognitive overload is likely to increase jurors' reliance
on load-reducing information "structures," like cognitive schemas, which
can hamper juror performance at collecting and processing information.
In order to deal with limitless information and inherent human limita-
tions, individuals form stories with the data they gather, and then view
additional evidence through the lens of these cognitive structures. 16' Al-
though helpful in many contexts, these structures can bias jury outcomes• 170
by skewing memory and the perception of evidentiary relevancy.
Schemas can be established early, and conflicting subsequent informa-
tion will be down-weighted, ignored, explained away, cognitively rear-
ranged or forgotten because it does not square with the juror's dominant
story. Individuals also forget evidence once they have acquired the
163. See, e.g., Lillquist, supra note 105, at 654-55 (describing "conjunction effects"). Taken alone,
this problem is not new post-Blakely; it affects jury findings at the guilt stage and judicial sentencing.
164. Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 29, at 767.
165. See David Kirsh, A Few Thoughts on Cognitive Overload, 30 INTELLECTICA, No. 1, at 19
(2000).
166. Posner, supra note 72, at 1523-24; Callen, supra note 36, at 1260-61.
167. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience
can Inform Economics 43 (NSF and Ctr. for Advanced Study in Behavioral Scis., Working Paper,
2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=590965.
168. Id. at 59-60. Such failures could exacerbate racial biases in sentencing. Moreover, they
could systematically tilt sentencing fact-finding against defendants. Combining multiple defendants or
charges into a single trial empirically increases each defendant's chance of conviction on every charge,
perhaps because "the evidence tends to cumulate in jurors' minds or to spill over from some issues to
others." Saks, supra note 80, at 32.
169. See generally Ronald Chen& Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004).
170. Id. at 1131-32.
171. Id. at 1139-43. More generally, people organize facts in ways that are consistent with their
experience and background, such that diverse jurors will reach diverse interpretations of the same
facts. Id. at 1143.
No. 2]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
"gist" of information, and will "fill gaps" by inadvertently making up in-
formation.172
Furthermore, cognitive overload risks undermining jurors' motiva-
tion and satisfaction as they become more and more frustrated with in-
formation-processing challenges. Organizational dynamics research, for
instance, finds that "complex structures generally lower worker morale
and motivation, both of which impact a system's effectiveness." '73 In ad-
dition to its effects on outcomes, this frustration may undercut jury ser-
vice's role in building civic responsibility and participatory democracy.
The perception that jurors are being left at sea could also undermine the
credibility of particular verdicts and of the criminal justice system.
B. Passivity and Free-Riding
Cognitive overload is a risk to which all humans are subject, judges
included. 74  An important question, then, is whether Blakely simply
shifts a problem inherent to complex sentencing schemes from one deci-
sion maker to another. One of the reasons why the answer to this ques-
tion is no is that, relative to the pre-Blakely arrangement, a post-Blakely
shift in sentencing fact-finding responsibility would concentrate the bur-
den of complexity on a single decision maker-the jury. The division of
fact-finding responsibility between judges and juries greatly reduces the
intricacy of the trial jury's task and, to some degree, reduces the burden
on the sentencing judge, who is responsible for presiding but not deciding
at the guilt stage. A shift to jury fact-finding at sentencing is likely to ex-
acerbate complexity problems for an even more significant reason than
the obvious effect of concentrating decision-making burdens, however.
Judges and juries are very different decision makers in very different set-
tings. Several factors will reduce jurors' ability to withstand cognitive
burdens relative to judges, at least unless and until sentencing fact-
finding is structured to maximize the advantages of group decision mak-
ing.
Judges preside over courtroom proceedings, providing them with
considerable control over what, when, and how information is presented
to them. They can ask lawyers and witnesses clarifying questions andS 175
take notes. In contrast, American jurors have traditionally carried out
their information acquisition tasks passively; they listen, watch, and read,
but almost never participate actively by asking questions of witnesses,
172. Id. at 1159.
173. Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 29, at 767; see also Kirsh, supra note 165, at 20 (explaining
that workplace complexity causes "tension with colleagues, loss of job satisfaction, and strained per-
sonal relationships").
174. Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 29, at 759 n.97.
175. Judges have other advantages: they are more experienced, can rely on clerks, and may be
more motivated because fact-finding is a part of their chosen career, and because they face the pros-
pect of appellate reprimand.
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judges, or lawyers.'76 Even if a juror anticipates a difficult deliberation,
she is generally not permitted to discuss the case with fellow jurors, even
if just to ask questions or clarify confusions, until deliberation begins,177
and she may even be prohibited from taking notes.18  Jurors are also
generally left uninformed: although they enter a courtroom with a basic
idea of their ultimate goal-to decide whether someone committed a
crime or whether certain sentencing factors apply-they usually receive
very little guidance on how precisely they should make the most of what
they see and hear."' These problems undermine the jury's ability to
process information efficiently and accurately. tS°
Juries also differ in an important way from most groups organized
to accomplish a common task: they do not coordinate their gathering• e • 181
and processing of information. In contrast, teams and committees, for
instance, are typically quite structured, benefiting from division of labor,
coordination, and sometimes leadership. 182 This difference may well be
justified-jurors play an important role as "peers" and as fellow citizens
181in a democracy, not solely as information processing cogs. Coordina-
tion might undermine these functions by weakening the perception that
twelve of a defendant's peers have independently reached the same con-
clusion about his guilt. Although the lack of coordination is less worri-
176. See generally Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and The Adversarial Ideal,
21 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 86, 96 (2002). Almost all jurisdictions now allow judges to permit
jurors to ask questions. See Judge Ken Curry & M. Beth Krugler, The Sound of Silence: Are Silent
Juries the Best Juries?, 62 TEX. B.J. 441,442 (1999). The practice is rarely implemented. But see Judge
John R. Stegner, Why I Let Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 541, 548-52
(2004). Jurors might ask inadmissible or otherwise biasing questions, but judges can filter out such
questions. See Jeffrey Reynolds Sylvester, Your Honor, May I Ask a Question? The Inherent Dangers
of Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 213, 220-22 (1990).
177. See David A. Anderson, Let Jurors Talk: Authorizing Pre-Deliberation Discussion of the
Evidence During Trial, 174 MIL. L. REV. 92, 93-94 (2002); Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans & G.
Thomas Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359,360 (2000).
178. Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Intuition and Social Psy-
chology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1, 29 n.90 (2004).
179. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2003) (Jurors
"may be given a brief lecture by the judge, or shown an orientation videotape, [that contains] a combi-
nation of solemn reminders of the vital importance of the jury in a democratic society, earnest exhorta-
tions to take their responsibility seriously.., and occasionally jurors will be told a little about the law,
such as the distinction between civil and criminal cases. Usually this is all the advance information
they get.").
180. See B. Michael Dann, From the Bench: Free the Jury, 23 LITIG. 1, 6 (Fall 1996) (noting that
passive juries, for example, result in "juror confusion, impairment of opportunities for learning, dis-
traction, and boredom").
181. Juries do select a foreman, but this might not happen until deliberations begin; and juries
differ in how they structure their deliberations. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better
Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205,214-16 (1989).
182. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779-81 (1972); Klaas J. Beniers & Otto H. Swank, On
the Composition of Committees, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 353,378 (2004) (listing references).
183. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 40, at 1099, 1152-54 nn.142-48 (2005); Toni M. Massaro, Per-
emptories or Peers? Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV.
501, 547-60 (1986).
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some in an adversarial setting in which defendants and prosecutors com-
pete by investigating, sifting, and presenting what is relevant in a way
that is intended to be comprehensible to each juror, 184 it nonetheless
raises significant hurdles in complex cases involving many separate mul-
tiple-choice questions. Even if critically needed, juror coordination is
simply not available to ensure that vital information is gathered.
Sentencing-stage jurors will, moreover, likely suffer from one of the
major disadvantages facing groups relative to individuals: the free rider
problem. As jurors face increased cognitive burdens, they are likely to
reduce their per-issue effort levels, opting to rely more on their fellow
jurors to acquire information. The underlying dynamic of free-riding is
straightforward: in groups faced with a collective responsibility, individ-
ual members cannot capture the full benefits of their efforts, and so they
work less hard. If a juror's labors are driven by a desire to see the cor-
rect outcome in a particular case, he will invest in obtaining information
only if his efforts can be translated directly into the verdict and sentence.
But a juror knows that he will not (in fact, cannot) make decisions with-
out the input of his peers, so individual efforts will be dampened at least
somewhat by the group setting of jury fact-finding. 85
Historically, juror free-riding in criminal trials has probably been• • 186 ..
fairly minor, and it has thus been virtually ignored by the jury reform
literature. This is likely to change if jurors are given substantial sen-
tencing fact-finding responsibility. Increasing the procedural and sub-
stantive complexity of criminal proceedings will significantly raise jurors'
cognitive costs while only fractionally increasing the benefits of ferreting
out the right answer. More tasks and more complexity will lead to re-
duced juror effort, or at least reduced per-task effort. The shift might
make little difference if jurors had endless time and physical and cogni-
tive energy, but humans have limits and adding each additional task gen-
erates incrementally larger costs 588 Sentencing-stage jurors may there-
fore see free-riding as not merely a shortcut but a necessity. Moreover,
deciding sentencing facts accurately, unlike correctly determining guilt,
184. However, adversarial competition alone is insufficient to ensure that juries can acquire and
process all of the information they need. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Informa-
tion of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 18 (1986).
185. Assuming the jurisdiction requires unanimity, as almost all do, a juror's incentive to acquire
information may be greater if he believes himself to be in the minority, since he is more likely to alter
the outcome. See Ellsworth, supra note 179, at 1388.
186. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at vii (describing jurors' "moral seriousness" and the fact
that they "almost never engage in selfish or strategic behavior").
187. We have found just one theoretical piece addressing the issue. See Kaushik Mukhopadhaya,
Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24,24 (2003).
188. This problem would be less significant if there were substantial overlap in a juror's tasks-for
example, if mastering one factual issue meant that the juror had already learned eighty percent of what
he needed to answer the next question. But sentencing facts are often quite distinct, see Part L.A su-
pra, and so substantial additional effort will likely be required for each one.
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may seem less important to jurors and therefore provide less "benefit.
1 89
Thus, as the complexity of jurors' tasks increase after Blakely, effort lev-
els may deteriorate considerably.
Jurors' motivations may be more complex than just increasing accu-
racy; individuals are also driven by a need to impress their peers. That
stimulus may partially remedy free-rider effects, because jurors may see
individual benefits from personally acquiring and accurately processing
information. But juror passivity during hearings and trials undercuts that
effect. Jurors do not know one another prior to being empanelled, and
therefore the only way for them to earn the respect of their peers is by
sending signals, such as appearing prepared and knowledgeable."' Pas-
sive jury settings make signaling one's effort or skills (by, for instance,
asking knowledgeable questions) during courtroom proceedings difficult.
As a consequence, jurors remain uncertain during trial and sentencing
hearings about the quality of their collection and processing of informa-
tion, a feeling that can dramatically reduce the incentive to work. 192
Moreover, if a juror believes that he is behind or has made mistakes, but
is unable to discover otherwise or "catch up" by clarifying points he
missed, he may give up altogether.' 93
The new burdens that may be imposed on jurors at the sentencing
stage threaten to generate exactly this sort of effect en masse. As many
jurors fall farther behind due to cognitive overload or become unsure
about what is important given all of the questions they are expected to
answer, they may throw up their hands and expend minimal effort-
accepting that they will be unable to impress their peers in deliberation
and that they should instead depend on others. Or, where presented
with multiple fact-finding tasks, jurors may decide that their best chance
of impressing their peers (and contributing to the accuracy of results) is
by focusing on just one or two of the sentencing factors and ignoring the
others-a reasonable approach, but one that, if the jury is uncoordinated,
189. This would be a misperception: so far as accuracy in punishment is concerned, the correct
determination of sentencing facts is actually overwhelmingly important, both to the offender and soci-
ety.
190. See generally Alvin Zander, The Psychology of Group Processes, in 30 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
417, 428-30 (Mark R. Rosenzweig & Lyman W. Porter eds., 1979). Or, for instance, if jurors were mo-
tivated by a feeling of satisfaction with participation in the democratic process, see Part III.C supra,
increased cognitive burdens and structural complexity post-Blakely might deeply undercut this motiva-
tion, causing an even more severe free-rider problem.
191. Cf ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
192. See Claude Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The "Irreversibility Effect," 64
AM. ECON. REV. 1006, 1006-07 (1974) (describing the basic problem); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979)
("[P]eople underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are ob-
tained with certainty. This... contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains .. "). But
see Christoph H. Loch, Bernardo A. Huberman & Suzanne Stout, Status Competition and Perform-
ance in Work Groups, 43 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35, 35 (2000) (arguing that uncertainty increases
effort as people work extra-hard to compensate for it).
193. See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Con-
tracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841,858-61 (1981).
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risks all jurors ignoring the same issues, likely the ones that are the most
difficult to determine.
C. Structural Simplification and Active Jury Approach
We propose attacking the serious problem of cognitive overload
from two angles: structuring jury proceedings at the sentencing stage to
reduce complexity, and providing the jury with the tools it needs to man-
age that complexity. Structurally, an important first step is bifurcation of
proceedings, which will essentially eliminate any increase in complexity
at the guilt stage. Complexity will remain a problem during the punish-
ment phase because multiple sentencing factors are likely to be at issue,
but unitary proceedings may worsen the problem by forcing the jury to
take on all the factual questions relevant to a defendant's culpability at194
once. Furthermore, if proceedings are bifurcated, jurors will enter the
sentencing stage having already deliberated on guilt, and therefore they
may have developed at least some sense of community and a cache of
experience, which may offset juror frustration and incentives to shirk t 95
Cognitive burdens can also be allayed by ensuring that each task is
approached discretely. One reason complexity spurs cognitive overload
is that multitasking -shifting constantly from one task to another-
triggers frustration and fatigue.196 That frustration is almost inevitable if
post-Blakely sentencing proceedings are structured to parallel criminal
trials-e.g., the state produces a series of witnesses, each of whom testi-
fies on different sentencing factors and then is cross-examined on each of
those issues, and then the defense produces its own series of witnesses,
repeating the process. But there is no reason sentencing proceedings
must follow this pattern. If sentencing can be detached from the finding
of guilt, then there is no reason each sentencing fact cannot be detached
from the others. We do not recommend separate deliberation for each
sentencing fact (as would be necessary to avoid multitasking completely),
because it would probably frustrate jurors and would certainly increase
costs, but sequential introduction of evidence on each sentencing factor
is an idea worthy of experimentation.
Further structural simplification could be achieved through changes
to the guidelines schemes themselves.1' 9 Although a real exploration of
substantive sentencing reform is beyond the scope of this article, we raise
194. See Murphy, supra note 156, at 43 (arguing for bifurcation to avoid "jury confusion"); see
also Lillquist, supra note 105, at 689 (arguing for bifurcation in states with jury sentencing on similar
grounds); cf. Vidmar, supra note 89, at 871 (describing bifurcation as a "procedural device intended to
reduce trial complexity").
195. See Gary Bornstein, Eyal Winter & Harel Goren, Experimental Study of Repeated Team-
Games, 12 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 629, 636-37 (1996); Armin Falk, Simon Gachter &Judit KovAcs, Intrin-
sic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives in a Repeated Game with Incomplete Contracts, 20 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 251,255 (1999).
196. See Kirsh, supra note 165, at 31-33.
197. See Darmer, supra note 156, at 572.
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one possibility: condensing the consideration of separate sentencing fac-
tors into a single jury determination. Balancing a range of aggravating
and mitigating factors, juries ultimately could simply characterize the of-
fense overall as being "aggravated, mitigated, or ordinary," or they could
rank the offense somewhere on a scale of wrongfulness, where the mid-
point is a "typical" example of the same offense. Consolidation would
help reduce structural complexity, t9 even though the substantive diffi-
culty of balancing or ranking the underlying factors would not change. It
thus presents an alternative solution to the multitasking problem -rather
than sequencing, tasks could be consolidated to eliminate the interrup-
tions of moving from factor to factor.2°°
Our second set of proposals is designed to improve jurors' informa-
tion-processing capacity and permit signaling to counteract collective ac-
tion problems. These ideas complement reforms targeted at reducing
complexity: jurors' responses to complexity can also be improved,2°1 even
though free-riding and information structure biases can never be entirely
eliminated. At the outset, in order to jolt jurors off their cognitive
crutches and to increase juror effort levels, judges should give jurors a
sense of individual responsibility or accountability for the acquisition of
information prior to the jury's taking evidence. 2  Judges should include
language in jury instructions that encourages jurors to take individual re-
sponsibility for their roles in the decision-making process, rather than re-
203lying on their fellow jurors. Judicial instructions to jurors should use
the cognitive power of "role schemas," which can lead jurors to behave
differently if they view their position and goals differently-as, for in-
stance, an individual fact-finder (similar to a judge) responsible for accu-
rately determining all the facts.2
Jury instructions, even if given before a jury takes evidence, often
fail to achieve their goals; but carefully crafted, clear, and plain language
198. See Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 29, at 769-74 (proposing similar simplification in the
judicial sentencing context).
199. Such an approach to reform might make criminal sentencing determinations similar to
analogous fact-finding in complex civil jury trials, issues which ultimately devolve to questions of the
existence of liability and the magnitude of damages.
200. Cf Kirsh, supra note 165, at 31 (noting that "task collapsing" may reduce workplace com-
plexity).
201. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law 15 (Harvard Law and Eco-
nomics Discussion Paper 495, Sept. 2004).
202. There exists some evidence that preinstructing juries may improve their ability to process
evidence more systematically, although there is substantial need for further research on the question.
See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Prob-
lems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 788, 803 (2000).
203. To some extent, judges already do this by saying things like, "The People and the defendant
are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror," but send mixed messages later, e.g., "Each of you
must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after discussing the evidence and instructions
with the other jurors." See Ellsworth, supra note 179, at 1390 (quoting the California Instructions,
CALJIC Nos. 17.40, 17.41, 17.42 (6th ed. 1996)).
204. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 169, at 1137, 1183,1197.
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can improve their effectiveness.205 Debiasing instructions, which do not
seek to teach jurors abstract legal concepts, but rather to define the task
and warn jurors of possible cognitive pitfalls, are more likely to suc-
ceed. 206 Eliminating subconscious biases may be easier said than done,
but instructions can hardly hurt, as long as they are not so long and com-
plex as to contribute to the problem of cognitive overload. If properly
crafted, they may yield the benefits of encouraging jurors to look for in-
formation-categorization and processing mistakes made by others and,
importantly, making each juror cognizant of the fact that other jurors will
be similarly searching for mistakes.2 07 Instructing jurors that they should
expect other jurors to use different facts to defend competing positions in
deliberation may induce every juror to be more accurate and informed,
both because they will be more cognizant of schema-induced compla-
cency and because differences of opinion can, in certain circumstances,
provide a competitive spur to diligence and concentration.2
A post-Blakely increase in jury fact-finding would also significantly
strengthen the arguments many scholars have long made for a shift to an
"active jury" model incorporating juror note-taking, question asking, and
discussions during breaks.209  The implementation of some version of
these reforms will help jurors process information, lightening the burden
of evaluating numerous sentencing factors. We will not rehash the well-
205. See, e.g., Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 202, at 802-03 (describing empirical evidence that
certain types of preinstructions typically do no good); Friedman, supra note 79, at 971; Judith L. Ritter,
Your Lips Are Moving but the Words Aren't Clear. Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors Understand
Instructions, 69 Mo. L. REV. 163, 197-201 (2004) (reviewing studies); see also supra note 107 (discuss-
ing the failures of limiting instructions).
206. For instance, a judge could instruct a jury along these lines: "People tend naturally to look
for stories that explain the information they receive, and then to use the stories to fill in gaps in the
information. And the attorneys are doing their best to create a story for you, one that can obscure
facts, unless you work hard to remain critical. You must do everything you can to consider each fact
on its own terms." An instruction like this uses a judge's authority and jurors' relative inexperience to
remind jurors of the potential biases in their thinking. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 169, at 1236.
For a detailed summary of jury instructions and the characteristics and subjects that are likely to make
them succeed or fail, see Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 202, at 794.
207. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 169, at 1233-35.
208. Cf. Kfir Eliaz, Debraj Ray & Ronny Razin, Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Dis-
agreement (Nota Di Lavora, Paper 83, 2004); Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Differences of Opinion
Make a Horse Race, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 473 (1993). If jurors believe they will have to justify their fac-
tual positions to fellow jurors, and jurors are unaware of the details of likely criticism, they will pre-
emptively self-criticize and potentially change positions if they cannot answer an argument. See Chen
& Hanson, supra note 169, at 1234-35.
209. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating Educated
and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1251, 1260 (1993); Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar,
Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1857-62 (2001); Valerie P. Hans,
Inside the Black Box: Comment on Diamond and Vidmar, 87 VA. L. REV. 1917, 1922-23 (2001); Doug-
las G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for
Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 549-51 (1997). But see JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 139-40 (G. Thomas
Munsterman, Paula L. Hannaford & G. Marc Whitehead eds., 1997); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 1.4(c) (2d ed. 1999). Some aspects of the active jury approach have been recently
tested in Arizona, where the state Supreme Court has sanctioned jury discussion during trials and
permitted discussions and deliberations in some civil trials to be videotaped for analysis by scholars.
See Diamond & Vidmar, supra, at 1869-74.
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developed arguments for these reforms. Instead, we focus on an impor-
tant advantage heretofore ignored by active jury advocates: certain types
of "activity" enable jurors to communicate with or signal to (and hence
monitor) each other during the presentation of evidence.210 Thus, in ad-
dition to amplifying jurors' ability to acquire information, the active jury
model can help ensure that jurors have the right incentives to do so. Ju-
ror signals during hearings and trials can induce more effort and reduce
cognitive bias.
For example, question asking by jurors will increase juror account-
ability and force jurors to question their take on the evidence presented.
Such questions should be filtered through the judge-perhaps by jurors
writing their questions down and passing them to the judge-so as to
prevent undue disruption to the proceedings or questioning that violates
whatever rules of evidence apply. Simply allowing jurors to submit ques-
tions would be a good first step: voluntary questions will reveal dis-
agreements among jurors, thereby dispelling any belief that consensus at
deliberation will be straightforward. Further, the option to ask questions
might be treated as an opportunity to distinguish oneself.
Beyond this modest suggestion, it may be worth contemplating ac-
tually requiring that jurors ask questions, an option we have not seen dis-
cussed in the jury reform literature. Consider a rule in which every juror
is required to submit a question-without the input of other jurors-
about each factual dispute the jury will determine. If authorship of ques-
tions were revealed, jurors would recognize that asking an obvious or ir-
relevant question would expose their free-riding. The drawbacks of juror
embarrassment or fear of embarrassment (which could cause juror frus-
211tration and thus harm performance) might well outweigh this benefit.
However, even requiring anonymous questions would be useful. The
asking of such questions would provide jurors with a window into their
peers' thinking. Jurors may consider the motivation for each question,
and, in so doing, think more critically about their own approaches to the
212relevant factual issues in the trial and any sentencing proceedings.
210. In fact, communication has been considered a major argument for the passive jury, since ask-
ing questions or communication canf be considered improper early deliberation. See Ellsworth &
Reifman, supra note 202, at 802-03; Kara Lundy, Note, Juror Questioning of Witnesses: Questioning
the United States Criminal Justice System, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2007, 2024-27 (2001).
211. On the other hand, it is well documented that juror embarrassment or shyness often keeps
jurors from asking judges questions when they are confused, leading at best to delay and at worst to
inaccurate outcomes. See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 202, at 804.
212. A possible drawback is that question asking might lead to a group story being (perhaps tac-
itly) agreed to early or, in the case of lack of consensus, to a failure to examine evidence unless it bears
on the disagreement between jurors. What evidence exists, however, does not support this concern.
See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innova-
tion, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 74-75 (2003). Moreover, juror discussion of cases happens regardless, and
jurors often talk about less useful or potentially more biasing subjects such as procedure and law. See
Terry Carter, ABA Committee Vets and Revises Proposals for Jury Standards, A.B.A. JOURNAL, Dec.
2004, at 63, 63 (quoting Louraine C. Arkfeld).
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Jury fact-finding at sentencing would also make two other reforms
to the passive jury model more attractive: allowing juror note-taking and• 213
juror discussions during trial or hearings. Note-taking helps to facili-214
tate memory, ever more important as jurors' tasks become more com-
plex. 215 Judges should affirmatively suggest that jurors take notes, advis-
ing that good notes can be useful in deliberation. Note-taking will
increase effort by serving as an imperfect, though constant (unlike ques-
216tion asking), signal during the presentation of evidence. If taking good
notes becomes a symbol of being a "quality" juror, then jurors will write
things down, and this may reduce the number of misremembered facts
improve attention, and help to overcome overload or reduced effort.213
Similarly, allowing juror conversations during breaks in proceedings will
facilitate signaling. If judges tell jurors to discuss factual ambiguities and
confusions during the presentation of evidence, and jurors anticipate be-
218ing evaluated by their peers during breaks, they will work harder.
They will also succumb to fewer cognitive mistakes if they are directed to
anticipate others' questions and be self-critical as to their own factualt_ . 219
theories.
Finally, it is also worth considering whether juries should be better
organized, for example, by enabling jurors to assign tasks among them-
selves prior to hearing evidence. To our knowledge, no attention has
been given to the plausibility or desirability of pre-hearing juror coordi-
nation. Small groups in other contexts avoid strategies of total redun-
dancy in which everyone does roughly the same thing. Redundancy may
reduce error, 2 but it also reduces effort and accountability. Therefore,
coordination might well increase effort and the cognitive resources de-
213. The American Bar Association recently adopted new jury principles (February 14, 2005) that
recommended similar changes, though for reasons unrelated to Blakely and the new burdens that will
accompany it. See Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, supra note 43, at 91.
214. See Larry Heuer & Steven Pernod, Increasing Juror Participating in Trials Through Note
Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 262 (1995).
215. Note-taking is also likely to eliminate the biases introduced by the ordering of evidence-
individuals are known to overvalue more recently acquired information-although group deliberation
already alleviates this problem. See Ahlawat, supra note 134, at 71.
216. See David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The
Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories 4 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, IZA
Discussion Paper No. 1222, Jury 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=571705 (finding in a labo-
ratory setting that moderate levels of monitoring increase effort levels); Omer Moav & Zvika Nee-
man, The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort 2 (Hebrew Univ., Working Paper, No. 2005-
1, 2005), available at http://ssm.comlabstract=651204 (studying a model in which a principal's access to
low quality and very high quality information about an agent's performance lowers that agent's effort
and which shows that moderately accurate information about effort provides the best incentives for
performance).
217. And unlike question asking as a signal, note-taking carries no negative "embarrassment" risk
with its attendant drawbacks. In that sense, it is a low-cost incentive.
218. We treat jury deliberation in greater detail in Part V.
219. Chen & Hanson, supra note 169, at 1233-35.
220. See Jack B. Soil, Intuitive Theories of Information: Beliefs About the Value of Redundancy, 38
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 317, 319 (1999) ("Although a redundant measurement has value, nonredundant
sources dominate due to the lower expected correlation in errors.").
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voted to each sentencing issue. Clearly, all jurors would be expected to
listen attentively at all stages of the proceedings, rather than sitting idly;
task division would not be absolute. But because testimony that relates
to multiple sentencing factors might be delivered too quickly for each ju-
ror to process all of the relevant points, having some jurors charged with
paying special attention to particular issues might help to ensure that
crucial information is not misunderstood or ignored.
Implementing a subgroup approach at the sentencing stage would
be complicated, in part because a jury would need additional structure in
order to assess the work quality of each subgroup. A mandatory reform
would also likely face constitutional objections, because courts might de-
termine that having aggravating sentencing factors-which Blakely
deemed constitutionally equivalent to offense elements-resolved by
only a subgroup of a jury runs afoul of the requirement that each ele-
ment be decided by a jury of adequate size. To some extent, these con-
cerns might be alleviated if it is understood that the full jury, though
guided by the views offered by "expert" subgroups, still must agree
unanimously on each element of the prosecution's case. In any event,
some criminal defendants might prefer a jury that divided tasks in a way
that improved its information-processing capacity, and so we suggest al-
lowing judges to permit such coordination upon the parties' agreement.
Such coordination would be easier in the sentencing stage of bifurcated
proceedings because jurors would already have familiarized themselves
with their collective information-gathering strengths and weaknesses.
Moreover, a brand-new, separate sentencing stage of jury proceedings
provides a rare opportunity to experiment with changes that might seem
too radical at the trial stage, where procedures are bound up with centu-
ries of tradition.
V. DELIBERATION ON SENTENCING FACTS
In addition to the reduced effort and amplified cognitive biases that
will affect each juror's individual assessment of sentencing facts, a shift to
jury fact-finding will also introduce sentencing distortions that result
from the group deliberation process. Groups that deliberate before vot-
ing often reach dramatically different outcomes than one would expect
given members' individual, predeliberation sentiments. 22' Deliberation
may improve decision making through information sharing, memory and
bias correction, and consensus building, but it can also generate several
perverse consequences, such as groupthink, polarization, or information
cascades. The Blakely revolution marks an ideal time to consider im-
221. See, e.g., Cass R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Delib-
erative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74-75 (2000).
222. Compare Ellsworth, supra note 181, at 206, and Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan,
Does Jury Deliberation Really Improve Jurors' Memories?, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 589
(2002), with IRVING JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1980). There are also significant advantages to group
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provements to this process. Not only does the shift from judges to juries
at sentencing mean a shift from individual to deliberative decision mak-
ing, but the juries of the future will be answering more, and more diffi-
cult, factual questions. This complexity risks significantly exacerbating
deliberative biases (as well as reducing the benefits to which traditional
advocates of deliberation point). However, structural reforms may serve
to alleviate these problems, at least in part.
A. Likely Effects of Deliberation Biases
Cass Sunstein has described two types of biases that infect the out-
comes produced by deliberating groups. The first are "informational
influences, which cause group members to fail to disclose what they
know because of deference to the information publicly announced by
others. 2 24 Information problems of this sort occur during deliberation
because individuals do not reveal everything they know (or think they
know) simultaneously. Instead, jurors reveal small amounts of informa-
tion or opinion over time; during that process, jurors are influenced by
those who speak before them.2z A juror who (correctly) knows a par-
ticular fact might (incorrectly) decide either that she is wrong or that the
fact is irrelevant, and thus might never share it, instead agreeing with
those who have already spoken. This agreement in turn creates a false
perception of consensus that will influence subsequent jurors, resulting in
an "information cascade" that magnifies distortion as deliberation pro-
ceeds. The second set of biases are "social pressures, which lead people
to silence themselves in order to avoid reputational sanctions."22 1 Social
pressures aggravate the informational influences by limiting dissent even
further: even if an individual identifies a mistake in the group's thinking,
he may nevertheless agree with the group to save face.
Deliberation can thus cause juries to "not correct but instead am-
plify individual errors, emphasize shared information at the expense of
unshared information, fall victim to cascade effects, and end up in a more
extreme position in line with the predeliberation tendencies of their
members. '27 Shifting sentencing decision making from judges to juries
raises the possibility of deliberation (and other group effects) biasing
sentencing outcomes. We do not have much new to offer on the general
decision making without deliberation (e.g., information markets). See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE
WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004). But elimination of deliberation in the criminal jury seems exceedingly
unlikely and probably ill-advised. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1320 (2000).
223. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 966.
224. Id.
225. Andrew Schotter, Decision Making with Naive Advice, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 196 (2003).
226. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 966.
227. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 313-14 (2004) (applying
this idea to appellate judges).
[Vol. 2006
IMPROVING JURIES AFTER BLAKELY
228
subject of deliberation bias. Instead, we focus on the likely conse-
quences of a shift to jury fact-finding in the specific context of fairly
complicated determinate sentencing systems. Such a shift is likely to
magnify deliberative biases in a number of important ways beyond what
we see now in ordinary guilt-stage deliberations.
Post-Blakely cognitive overload and associated reduction in effort
will result in jurors not only having less information about each issue at
their disposal, but likely being less confident in their individual predelib-
eration conclusions.229 Greater uncertainty may reduce individual jurors'
willingness to dissent from the group, and dissent is a key ingredient for
self-correction when a group is heading in the wrong direction.2 A
2311probable consequence is the exacerbation of information cascades.
Sunstein, for example, notes that in a group where most members are
suffering from cognitive biases-such as framing, conjunction, and an-
choring effects -individuals who might be able to steer the group back
on path must "have a high degree of confidence to do so. 232  Post-
Blakely cognitive overload thus seems likely to dampen dissent.
Shifting sentencing fact-finding responsibilities will also magnify
another deliberation bias: the common knowledge effect. Deliberating
groups tend to focus on information that is held by all group members,233
rather than that held by only one member or a few. In part, this is be-
cause it is more likely that information held by several people will
emerge or will be reiterated more frequently than information held by a
234single person. How might Blakely aggravate this bias? Studies that
demonstrate and analyze the common knowledge effect usually proceed
by distributing some set of information to everyone and other "hidden"fw235
knowledge to only a few. The initial distribution is held fixed. But a
clear implication of these studies (and the statistical and social hypothe-
ses underlying them) is that if each piece of hidden information were
228. See generally Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622 (2001); Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun
& Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687
(1996).
229. See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confi-
dence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 413-14 (1992); Shinji Teraji, Herd Behavior and the Quality of
Opinions, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 661, 662-64 (2003). Some jurors may recognize that everyone else is
similarly less informed. Nonetheless, it is likely that the number of individuals in the group positioned
to dissent will drop, which is enough to magnify cascade effects.
230. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 1016.
231. See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of
Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 162 (1998).
232. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 993.
233. See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, The Common Knowledge Effect-Information Sharing
and Group Judgments, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 959, 960 (1993).
234. Id. Information held by fewer persons may also be disproportionately down-weighted. Id.
235. See Garold Stasser & William Titus, Hidden Profiles: A Brief History, 14 PSYCH. INQUIRY
304, 304 (2003); Garold Stasser & William Titus, Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision
Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1467,
1468 (1985).
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held by even fewer people, the bias caused by the common knowledge
effect would be stronger.
To illustrate, recall that in Part IV we noted that, without coordina-
tion of some sort, jurors who are overwhelmed with information are
likely to respond by ignoring certain questions or types of data, particu-
larly if they are complicated or otherwise difficult to process. Jurors' re-
sponses to these challenges are likely to be at least somewhat corre-
lated-i.e., people will avoid the same confusing evidence and focus on
236the same easier-to-understand information. In extreme cases, every
juror might miss a crucial piece of data, meaning that the jury would not
have sufficient information even absent deliberative biases. But in less
extreme cases, hidden information may just be more hidden-a single ju-
ror instead of a few will notice a piece of evidence, for instance. The
jury will still "have" this information in an important sense but, because
fewer jurors will be personally aware of it, juries will become even more
likely to ignore it. Put differently, common knowledge will become even
more dominant. And social influences will further magnify this change:
it is harder, in the face of reputational costs, for a single uror to stand on
a piece of information than it is for a few jurors to do so.
A shift to jury fact-finding at the sentencing phase would not only
increase the bulk of information that jurors must process, but would also
require that juries answer multiple questions with multiple answers. As
we discussed in Part III, when presented with multiple answer choices,
jurors will tend to pick middle options. This individual tendency may be
compounded, in a deliberating jury, by compromises that groups make
among their members in order to reach a single, unified answer.
Sentencing facts may be determined by group negotiation in two
different ways. First, jurors might compromise with respect to one par-
ticular question-with three options for a particular fact, if there is sub-
stantial disagreement, they may agree to pick the middle option even if
few or no jurors actually believe that choice to be correct. Second, jurors
might "trade" across facts. A jury with one or two holdouts who wishes
to acquit a defendant may be persuaded to convict in exchange for find-
ings on sentencing facts that minimize the defendant's exposure. 23' Both
236. See Part IV.B supra. Reducing these correlations is one argument in favor of diverse juries,
or role assignment among jurors, discussed both above in Part IV and below.
237. This effect may be similar to enlarging the group, which increases the focus on common
knowledge to the detriment of hidden knowledge. See Garold Stasser, Laurie A. Taylor & Coleen
Hanna, Information Sampling in Structured and Unstructured Discussions of Three and Six Person
Groups, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 67, 68 (1989). If so, additional concern is warranted,
because larger groups tend to be more confident in their ultimate decisions, regardless of accuracy. Id.
at 72.
238. See Felix C. Brodbeck et al., The Dissemination of Critical, Unshared Information in Deci-
sion-Making Groups: The Effects of Pre-Discussion Dissent, 32 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 35, 37 (2002);
Ellsworth, supra note 179, at 1397 ("A minority of two is many times stronger than a minority of
one.").
239. These deliberative effects might reduce the likelihood of hung juries, though there is not
much room for improvement on that score. See Saks, supra note 80, at 39-40 (observing that the hung
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effects will reduce sentencing accuracy, as compromise solutions may re-
flect no one's view of the actual facts of the case.
Moreover, deliberation over multiple sentencing factors at once will
likely exacerbate inaccuracies that stem from status differences.240 Many
scholars have documented the relationship between social status and in-. • 241
dividual behavior in the jury setting. Occupation, age, gender, and race
all play an important role in jury deliberation: those in low-status (i.e.,
less powerful) groups typically participate less and are less willing to
"correct" a forming consensus even if they believe the emerging decision•242 . ...
to be incorrect. This bias is disturbing in any context, but in multiques-
tion proceedings at the sentencing stage, it will likely be much worse: if a
low-status person is willing to offer "hidden" information at odds with a
growing consensus, she may only be willing to do so once. As Sunstein
explains, "[L]ow-status members of groups are 'increasingly reluctant
over the course of discussion to repeat unique information.' Those in a
group who are inexperienced, or are thought to be low on the hierarchy,
are particularly loathe to emphasize their privately held information as
discussion proceeds.
243
Thus, over time, status biases harden. With only one fact to find,
the loss of accuracy might be negligible if people can share what they
know quickly and early, even if they refuse to press that information in
later discussions. But low-status individuals suffer group disapproval for
offering "hidden" information, information that is helpful in ensuring
that the group arrives at the right answer. And if jurors are once bitten,
twice shy in the context of a single question, it seems probable that they
will be even less likely to dissent from the majority over, say, the seventh
fact-finding question.
Blakely's requirements are also likely to worsen group polarization,
another well known problem in group decision making. Polarization,
which is driven principally by informational cascades and reputational
pressures, occurs when "members of a deliberating group end up in a
more extreme position in line with their tendencies before deliberation
began. 2 45 Importantly, polarization does not always produce the wrong
answer, but it does introduce randomness and thus increases variance in
jury "problem" has been overstated: "the rate of hung juries has been tiny [a few percent], and consis-
tently so for decades"). The compromise approach may also be seen as a form of jury nullification:
the deliberate choice of an outcome not supported by the application of the law to the facts, in order
to satisfy jurors' sense of justice.
240. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 987.
241. See, e.g., Taylor-Thompson, supra note 222, at 1281-1308.
242. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 26.
243. Id. (quoting Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 235, at 308).
244. This problem becomes even more worrisome if low status groups are, as a result of their dif-
ferent backgrounds and experiences, more likely to acquire hidden information.
245. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 1004 (citing ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 202-26 (1986)).
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outcomes. 246  Further, polarization can affect both factual and value
247
judgments.
Polarization will be amplified post-Blakely because certain sentenc-
ing factors will require that jurors choose an answer along a range, while
the sentencing scheme taken as a whole inherently offers a range of pos-
sible conclusions. Before Blakely, jury polarization effects were princi-
pally documented in the context of compensatory or punitive damages
calculations in civil trials. 248  In criminal trials where a single binary
choice rather than a range of choices is presented, polarization is likely
249important only in increasing confidence levels. Polarization tends to
affect groups that agree at the outset; assuming all the jurors agree that a
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, if the jury is not involved
in sentencing, there is no consequence to further increasing certainty of
guilt or motivation to punish. A sentencing-stage jury that, through de-
liberation, becomes more convinced of guilt may, however, add a finding
that the offense was aggravated. Moreover, the multiplicity of sentenc-
ing questions may exacerbate polarization in another way. Polarization
stems in part from reinforcement of confidence, but confidence is not
necessarily issue-specific. Just as low-status perception can become more
problematic over time, an overconfident juror who succeeds in convinc-
ing others as to the first sentencing factor may push even harder in delib-
eration over the second, and so forth.2' °
Occasionally, two of the effects of Blakely we have discussed-
compromise and polarization effects-may offset one another. But that
prospect does not obviate either problem: polarization may occur in
some cases and compromise in others, leading to inaccurate results in
both kinds of cases. Even if the effects perfectly cancelled each other so
that the average outcome across a wide range of cases was unaffected by
the combination of the two biases, that fact would be cold comfort if ju-
ries were getting large numbers of individual cases wrong.
B. Improving Deliberation Outcomes
Groups often outperform individual experts in correctly answering
factual questions so long as each group member contributes independ-
246. See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic Than In-
dividuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages 2 (U. Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 81, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=177368; Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Law of Group Polarization 3-4 (U. Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 91, 1999), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=119668.
247. See SUNSTEIN ETAL., supra note 35, at 57-58.
248. See generally, e.g., id. at 43,57-58.
249. See Mark G. Frank et al., Individual and Small Group Accuracy in Judging Truthful and De-
ceptive Communication, 13 GROUP DEC. & NEGOTIATION 45, 52-53 (2004).
250. See Robert S. Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 537, 557 (1996).
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ently and group membership is reasonably diverse.2 Add deliberation,
however, and the accuracy and reliability of group decision making be-
comes much less certain. Informational and social pressures can push
juries away from the right answers, even when juries are asked only to
decide questions of guilt and innocence. But Blakely's requirement that
juries decide sentencing facts, at least in a world of determinate sentenc-
ing, will significantly dampen dissent and intensify group polarization,
thereby decreasing accuracy and amplifying sentence variance. Viable
reform options capable of insulating the jury from such deliberative fail-
ures do exist, however, and legislatures should consider implementing
them along with other changes made necessary or attractive by
Blakely."
One major goal of deliberation is to induce jurors to share all the in-
formation they know. Simple instructions to this effect could have a• 254
great deal of influence; jurors respect and attempt to follow jury in-
structions, and if clearly worded, instructions can be effective.5' There-
fore, when appropriate, judges should explain to juries that they are to
answer factual questions that have correct answers-that is, in those cir-
cumstances in which juries are being asked simply to establish a fact (e.g.,
the quantity of drugs involved in the crime, or whether the defendant
used a gun) rather than to pass the kinds of normative judgments that are
often bound up in sentencing "fact-finding."2 56 Groups perform better at
sharing information, working as a team, and avoiding deliberative biases
if members believe that the group has acquired sufficient information to
251. See Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups
of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 16,385 (2004); Robinson & Spellman,
supra note 6, at 1138-46. When deliberation focuses on the meaning of law, deliberation is less clearly
useful even under ideal conditions. See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 202, at 806.
252. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 982-84.
253. One possible reform that we do not discuss is changing the size of juries. Larger and more
diverse juries increase the range of perspectives on information and make division of labor and sub-
grouping easier. But larger groups can exacerbate the biases of common knowledge and foster free-
riding. There is also a cost obstacle to this reform, as well as the likelihood that, assuming unanimity
remains required, hung juries would more frequently result.
254. Others have suggested that judges may improve jury decision making by offering suggestions
to jurors on how to deliberate. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, JURIES FOR THE YEAR
2000 AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEMS OF WASHINGTON, DC 65 (1998),
available at http://www.courtexcellence.org/juryrefornm/juries_2000-final-report.pdf. On the other
hand, reformers must be careful not to overwhelm jurors with many new instructions, especially if they
are complicated. See William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 731, 747 (1981). In general, there may be a "ceiling" to how much improvement can be
achieved through new and better instructions, though it is clear that well-designed improvements can
have dramatic effects. See Peter W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the
Comprehension of Jury Instructions, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 381, 381 (1997).
255. See Reid Hastie, Experimental Evidence of Group Accuracy, in INFORMATION POOLING AND
GROUP DECISION MAKING (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds. 1983); see also Ritter, supra
note 205, at 199.
256. See generally Garold Stasser & Dennis D. Stewart, Discovery of Hidden Profiles by Decision-
Making Groups: Solving a Problem Versus Making a Judgment, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
426 (1992).
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determine the answer, that getting the right answer is the goal, and that
accomplishing it is only a matter of time.
Jurors should also be asked to record their thoughts and beliefs-
some of which will be hidden information-prior to deliberation. These
private, predeliberation diaries can serve as "anchors" for each juror, re-
ducing the likelihood of polarization. Jurors should also be directed to
submit their predeliberation opinions anonymously to the group.259 If ju-
rors share their initial opinions regarding a defendant's degree of culpa-
bility before any deliberation takes place-and they do this simultane-
ously, rather than revealing their opinions sequentially-jurors will
receive a snapshot of one another's views, one that is not influenced by
informational or reputational pressures. Information sharing (perhaps in
the form of an initial predeliberation vote) should occur in an iterated
setting. Iteration can be used to generate feedback loops, allowing jurors
to assess and respond to what other jurors believe is important, thereby
prompting each to offer information not deemed relevant on the first go-
around. Eventually, incorporating technology and deliberation-
enhancing "devices" (for example, computers that allow anonymous ex-
change of information and the organization of data are already used in
business settings) may succeed at reducing status problems and encour-.. .. 261
aging participation on an equal footing.
As we noted in Part IV, despite potential constitutional problems,
reformers should consider the possibility of asking judges to direct juries
to assign certain roles (perhaps particular factual questions) to individu-
als or subgroups of the jury prior to hearing evidence (or to allow the
parties to agree to such structure). Superimposing juror roles (either
self-selected or randomly assigned) over the existing jury social struc-
tures during the deliberation process would have important implications,
262not all of them necessarily beneficial. One reasonably likely conse-
quence is that assigning roles would create an "expert," making the
group less susceptible to the social and informational pressures we have
257. Id. at 432-33.
258. A drawback of public predeliberation voting is that jurors may find it hard to retreat from
positions to which they have publicly committed themselves. For this reason, recording one's thoughts
in notes or anonymously voting seem to be superior options.
259. Anonymity can eliminate social pressures and causes more "hidden" information to be re-
vealed. Cf. TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 13-15 (1995); Susanne Lohmann, Collec-
tive Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers, 14 J. ECON. SURV. 655,
658 (2000).
260. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 1018.
261. See Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century,
66 BROOK. L. REV. 1257, 1269-87 (2001); Maria E. Hacker, The Effect of Decision Aids on Work
Group Performance 70-71 (Apr. 10, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Inst.
and State University).
262. Cf. Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 504-15 (2002);
William D. Stiehl, Insights into the Deliberative Process, 21 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 11, 12 (2002).
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described, although these might be replaced by new pressures for oth-
ers in the group to defer to the experts even if they suspect the experts
might be wrong. Whether such reforms would constitute an improve-
ment will turn on whether experts or expert subgroups, having been as-
signed to particular factual tasks, are more likely to be right as a conse-
quence of increased focus and reduced deliberation-induced bias.
In a similar vein, where possible, juries should be encouraged-
264again, through simply worded judicial instructions or suggestions -
265toward healthy internal competition. One approach, other than using
roles, would be the use of devil's advocates, although jurors are less
likely to heed criticism that is not truly believed by its defender.26' A
second option is to assign tasks to individuals or subgroups, and then as-
sign "discussants" directed to be critical of the factual opinions ex-
pressed. More generally, anticipated criticism (without knowledge of
any specifics) will force jurors to keep open minds.268 Factual accuracy
might even be enhanced by more radical reforms: for instance, dividing
juries for deliberation purposes into two groups that initially do not
communicate. The smaller groupings might more effectively unearth
hidden information and, arguably, might improve performance if jurors
perceive a benefit (social validation, or simply ending deliberations ear-
lier) from arriving at the same answer as the other group.269
Bifurcating factual deliberations, so that each fact is deliberated on
and decided sequentially, may reduce "vote trading" among jurors. The
reason tracks the intuition of the Prisoner's Dilemma: if a juror has to
vote now for a concession later, he may anticipate defection by his trad-
ing partner. That is, a holdout may be unwilling to vote (against his con-
science) to convict if he is not confident that other jurors will really offer
sentencing leniency after another stage of the proceedings has passed.
Further, to the extent bifurcation minimizes cognitive overload, it will
reduce Blakely's exacerbation of deliberative biases, especially at the
threshold guilt stage. A further restructuring possibility would divide
263. See Garold Stasser, The Uncertain Role of Unshared Information in Collective Choice, in
SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS 49, 56-57 (Leigh L. Thompson, John M. Levine, & David M.
Messick eds., 1999); Garold Stasser, Dennis D. Stewart & Gwen Wittenbaum, Expert Roles and In-
formation Exchange During Discussion: The Importance of Knowing Who Knows What, 31 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 244, 262--64 (1995); Garold Stasser, Sandra I. Vaughn & Dennis D.
Stewart, Pooling Unshared Information: The Benefits of Knowing How Access to Information is Dis-
tributed Among Group Members, 82 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROCESSES 102, 105-06 (2000).
264. Because jury deliberations take place in secret, there may be no practical way to ensure that
any given jury actually follows particular structural suggestions.
265. See Part IV supra.
266. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 1016 ("Those assuming the role of devil's
advocate will not face the reputational pressure that comes from rejecting the dominant position
within the group; they have been charged with doing precisely that. And because they are asked to
take a contrary position, they are freed from the informational influences that can lead to self-
silencing.").
267. See id. at 40.
268. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 169, at 1233-35.
269. Cf Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 122, at 1016.
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jury deliberation, perhaps on each factual question, into two distinct
phases. The first stage should focus on information revelation and dis-
agreement to elicit hidden information, with jurors expressly encouraged
to avoid pressuring one another toward consensus, while the second
stage should aim at the traditional goal of achieving agreement.
We recognize that some of these ideas amount to a sharp break with
tradition, and courts or legislatures may be reluctant to implement them
at the trial stage for this reason. Again, however, we note that there is no
traditional form for separate jury hearings designed to find facts related
to sentencing, and so the creation of these new proceedings may provide
a window to experiment with new deliberation structures. Moreover,
many of the reforms we suggest above are perfectly consistent with exist-
ing jury practice. At the very least, a requirement of predeliberation vot-
ing and/or individual recording of thoughts, arguments, and evidence
should be explored.
VI. CONCLUSION
A post-Blakely shift to jury fact-finding at sentencing would signifi-
cantly complicate the criminal jury's task, introducing certain distortions
and exacerbating some existing ones. Policymakers should not underes-
timate the significance of these effects, for they may seriously threaten
the proper functioning of the jury. A realistic appreciation of these con-
cerns should guide state legislatures as they make the threshold policy
choice whether to commit sentencing fact-finding to the jury in the first
place or to follow instead the Booker route of abandoning mandatory
sentencing guidelines.
Some will likely decide, in the end, that mandatory sentencing is not
worth the "constitutional tax" that compliance with Blakely may im-170
pose. Yet legislatures that wish to retain determinate sentencing
should not be overly discouraged, nor should the automatic response to
Booker be the revision of their sentencing schemes so that jury involve-
ment is unnecessary. Thoughtful structuring of sentencing fact-finding
proceedings can likely alleviate many of the difficulties that will emerge.
It is essential, therefore, that state policymakers turn their attention to
developing solutions to the new problems juries will face at the sentenc-
ing stage. Neither the liberty of criminal defendants nor the interest of
the public in effective punishment and a credible criminal justice system
should turn on the performance of a jury that has not been equipped
with the tools, structures, and procedures to do its job well.
By demanding that states essentially reinvent their criminal sentenc-
ing processes, Blakely has provided a window to test reform proposals,
many of which have long been suggested in the trial context as well but
270. 542 U.S. 296, 318 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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have encountered resistance. Because each state with binding guidelines
will likely respond to Blakely in somewhat different ways, the coming
years will provide an excellent opportunity to test and compare different• 271 T,
approaches. In responding to Blakely, states should remain flexible
and open to policy reforms during this period of flux, learning from the
successes and failures of other approaches.
We hope, therefore, that some states adopt completely different ap-
proaches than the ones we suggest. That said, if we were designing a
post-Blakely jury fact-finding sentencing system for a state that wished to
retain mandatory guidelines, it would have a few essential features:
* Proceedings should be bifurcated, which would solve the eviden-
tiary "relevance problem," mitigate compromise and decoy ef-
fects, eliminate new complexities at the trial stage and reduce
them at the sentencing stage, and provide an opportunity to ex-
periment with procedural reforms that might prove too great a
break with tradition at the trial phase.
" At the sentencing phase, certain rules of evidence should apply-
most notably, the relevance rule and the exclusion of overly
prejudicial evidence-but hearsay should be unrestricted unless it
interferes with the defendant's constitutional confrontation rights,
special restrictions on prior bad act evidence should be lifted, and
restrictions should not apply to the extent they interfere substan-
tially with the defendant's ability to introduce mitigating evi-
dence.
" During sentencing proceedings, jurors should be permitted to take
notes and discuss the case during breaks, and be permitted or pos-
sibly required to submit anonymous questions to the judge.
Judges should issue instructions designed to alert jurors to the
risks of reliance on heuristics, and be permitted to experiment,
upon the parties' agreement, with allowing jurors to coordinate
information-gathering responsibilities, and with structuring the
proceedings sequentially on a per-issue basis.
" Special verdict forms submitted to the jury should contain care-
fully selected answer choices excluding potentially distorting op-
tions not supported by the evidence. Where jurors are asked to
make a qualitative or comparative judgment, judges should pro-
vide them with a set of concise relevant comparisons, standard-
271. Cf. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 379
(2005).
272. See Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing: Learning From, and Worrying About, the States, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 933, 942 (2005); see also id. at 935 ("In the area of sentencing, the states have genu-
inely served as laboratories for experimentation."); see generally DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES
OF DEMOCRACY (1988).
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ized by a sentencing commission for each sentencing factor and
major category of underlying offense.
Judges should advise jurors, before commencing deliberations, of
certain procedures that can improve the quality of deliberations.
Jurors should be directed to write down their impressions and
share them anonymously, and to consider seriously a few well-
thought-out ways of internally organizing discussions. Sentencing
facts might also be deliberated and voted on sequentially, in order
to reduce compromise effects.
Many will probably disagree with our specific proposals, but we
think it is difficult to gainsay our central point: sentencing-stage juries
will face diverse and complex tasks that they are in many cases ill-
equipped to handle. Ensuring jury competence to carry out these tasks is
absolutely critical, and so it is essential that legislatures wishing to main-
tain determinate sentencing think creatively about structures and proce-
dures that might improve the accuracy of jury decision making. In that
creative spirit, although some of our ideas are straightforward, relatively
conservative, and low-cost, we have also raised some ideas that have
never been tried before in any context, much less in jury sentencing fact-
finding proceedings. There is, of course, no substitute for careful obser-
vation of how such ideas actually play out in practice. The post-Blakely
revolution will provide us the opportunity to find out.
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